On 21 September 2024, the New York Times reported Albania’s plan to create the State of Bektashi. Bektashi is a Muslim Shiite Sufi order founded in the 13th century in Turkey with its headquarters based in Albania since 1930. On 22 September 2024, Mr Edi Rama, the Prime Minister of Albania announced the same plan during his speech at the UN General Assembly. Before the New York Times report, no one in Albania had ever heard of the idea that one day a micro religious state of Bektashi may emerge in Albania’s capital. This was never officially discussed in Government, Parliament, or religious communities. Even the leader of Bektashi community head father Hajji Dede Edmond Brahimaj, known as Baba Mondi, was taken by surprise. Mr Rama, a nonpracticing Roman Catholic, said, “only a few of his closest aides know about the plan and NATO allies like the United States have not been consulted”.
While the real political motives behind this plan remain unclear, Mr Rama mentioned that the creation of such a moderate Islamic microstate, would send a message: “Do not let the stigma of Muslims define who Muslims are.” According to the New York Times, the State of Bektashi “will be a Vatican-style sovereign enclave controlling territory about the size of five New York City blocks, and it will allow alcohol, let women wear what they want and impose no lifestyle rules”. Political analysts in Albania have called it an absurd and crazy idea. With such preliminary qualifications, the project oscillates between the Republic of Rose Island, and the State of Vatican. In this blog, we will explore what the project of the State of Bektashi is about, the legal hurdles to create and recognize such an unprecedented entity, and the legal consequences in the case of its potential creation.
International and constitutional law questions on State creation
International law does not contain guidelines on State creation. However, it does provide for certain rights and prohibitions. As regards the former, international law recognises the right to self-determination of peoples (ICJ AO on Kosovo, para 79). Concerning the latter, international law prohibits state creation in cases where the putative state emerges as a result of a violation of the prohibition to use of force or other jus cogens norms (ICJ AO on Kosovo, para 81). Neither of them appears to be applicable to the present case as the Bektashi community is not in a struggle for self-determination but rather a spectator of an external political project. It appears that in the event of the creation of the State of Bektashi, it will be Mr Rama and not Baba Mondi the founder father of the newest State.
The creation of the State of Bektashi would also need to fulfil the Montevideo criteria. The question of territory and population, however small, may not prove to be difficult to establish. However, effective government will depend on whether Bektashi community agrees on state creation and whether the creation of the State of Bektashi will not result in any popular unrest. Albanian local media reports that while Baba Mondi has endorsed the idea, some Bektashi leaders would not support such an initiative. Furthermore, there has been an overwhelming popular criticism towards the idea of such a state creation. Lastly, capacity to enter into relations could be secured in case Albania supports the state creation. While Bektashi state would be dependent on Albania as regards certain state functions, this will not be the first or last State to have dependency on other states as regards military or other type of support.
The most controversial legal aspect is expected to revolve around the question of consent from Albania, and this largely shifts the discussion to constitutional law.
So far, there is no precise information on how Albania plans to express its consent. What we know so far, however, is that “[a] team of legal experts, including international lawyers, is drafting legislation defining the new state’s sovereign status inside Albania. That will need to be endorsed by Parliament, controlled by Mr Rama’s governing Socialist Party”. One could argue that there is a general indication that Albania aims to adopt a law that will be endorsed by Parliament. However, it is not clear whether this law will amount to changing the Constitution, whether it will be a law adopted by 2/3 majority, or an ordinary law. This question will prove relevant, as the creation of the State of Bektashi will have a direct impact on the indivisibility, territorial integrity and unitary character of the State as protected by, among others, Articles 1 and 3 of Albania’s Constitution.
Recognition of the Bektashi State
Even provided that the creation of the Bektashi State passes certain legal and political hurdles, it is questionable whether other States will recognize them. A number of Arab Muslim majority states, including Muslim Suni, may view Bektashi divergent from their view of Islam, and be worried that such a religious order may represent their religion at the international level. Other States may worry that such an exercise of State creation may encourage the creation of other religious states, and trigger more secessionist movements. Even in case of a formal recognition, considering the relatively small number of Bektashi community in the world, it is even more questionable how many States may be willing to enter into diplomatic relations with the Bektashi State.
The uniqueness of the Bektashi State and the limits of the Vatican analogy
The Bektashi State would be unique in modern international law in that, rather than following a self-determination struggle, a State dissolution, or an agreement among international legal subjects, its creation would be unilaterally engineered by its parent State. Several media drew a parallel with the Vatican City to explain the creation of the Bektashi State, but such an analogy is only partially convincing. The two states would certainly have in common a prominent religious element and the status of ‘micro-state’ (they would actually be the two smallest states in the world, with the Bektashi State reaching the new record of 0,1 square kilometres, one quarter of the Vatican’s territory). However, the Vatican City State was created by means of the Lateran Treaty, that is an agreement between two sovereign subjects (the Kingdom of Italy and the Holy See), and not unilaterally by Italy. To be sure, in 1929, when the treaty was concluded, the Holy See had already played for more than a millennium an important role in international relations, crowning emperors, mediating among sovereigns, and developing one of the most ancient diplomacies in the world (see Ryngaert, 831, 836). For many centuries, it had exercised its sovereignty over the State of the Church, and preserved its international legal personality even after the Kingdom of Italy annexed the State of the Church in 1870 (ibid., 833, 836). So, despite Italy’s necessary agreement to the creation of the Vatican City State, the Lateran Treaty constituted a negotiated solution between sovereigns, not a unilateral act.
Nothing of the sort can be said of the Bektashi State. The Bektashi order has not so far played a role in international relations which is comparable to that of the Holy See, it has never exercised sovereign powers over a territory, and does not appear to possess international legal personality. This means that future agreements between Albania and the Bektashi order concerning the creation of a State could not be regarded as international agreements, and that unilateral promises made by Albania to the Bektashi order would arguably not produce legal effects in international law. For these reasons, the Bektashi State will probably not come into existence by means of an international agreement, but most likely via a domestic legislative act, the validity of which will largely depend on Albania’s constitutional law. For this reason, as noted above, the question of the valid consent of Albania should be examined also, perhaps mainly, from the standpoint of Albania’s constitutional law.
State Immunity
Once created, the Bektashi state may invoke a number of state rights and prerogatives, including, as an illustration, the capacity to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction extraterritorially, the capacity to conclude treaties and join international organizations, the right of self-defence, and so on. The list could be long. Given the peculiar intermingling of religious and governmental elements that would characterize the new state, however, one specific question that may emerge and which we would like to address is whether the acts performed by the apical organs of the Bektashi order may be covered by state immunity.
In this specific regard, the comparison with the Holy See may be illustrative. A number of national courts have been called to determine whether sex abuse victims could sue the Holy See in relation to the paedophilia scandal in the Church. US courts and Belgian ones granted immunity to the Holy See, and the ECtHR held that by doing so Belgium had not violated the right of access to court. In an article co-authored with Cedric Ryngaert, one of us contended, in disagreement with the ECtHR, that one should distinguish the acts that the Holy See performs as supreme authority of the Vatican City State and those that it performs as Head of the Roman Catholic Church, and uphold state immunity only in relation to the former. Even if one rejected such a view, the question would remain of whether an act related to the management of an ecclesiastic organization could be considered jure imperii.
Addressing a related legal issue, Dapo Akande discussed whether the Pope enjoys personal immunity under international law. The question is currently being litigated before the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia, in a case concerning sex abuses.
If one considers that in the Albanian plan the Headquarters of the of Bektashi order should largely coincide with the Bektashi State, and that the Bektashi spiritual leader has been indicated as the future Head of such State, it becomes apparent that similar problems could arise in relation to the Bektashi State as well. The main question in this regard is whether acts concerning the management of an international religious organizations should be covered by immunity when performed by religious organizations largely overlapping with a State Government. This issue is closely related to that of the accountability of the religious organizations operating internationally, which could take advantage of their close relationship with a State in order to seek impunity for their misconduct.
Conclusion
Although in our view the State of Bektashi is a unicum when it comes to the modality of its creation, nothing in international law prohibits the creation of new States that emerges with the consent of the parent State and desire of the putative state. However, securing the consent of the parent state may prove more complex than Mr Rama may have envisaged. A loss of territory will conflict with Articles 1 and 3 of Albania’s Constitution. While constitutional amendments may pave the way for such a state, the popular reaction so far suggests that such constitutional amendment are not within reach.
Be that as it may, even in the event of its creation, we are sceptical that such a State will receive a large number of recognitions, let alone secure a good number of diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the creation of the State of Bektashi, depending on its organisation and treaty arrangements with Albania, would trigger a set of complex questions regarding the issues of immunity, accountability, and the management of an international religious entity.
