Andrea Pettrachin and Matteo Bassoli argue that while Italy’s deal with Albania has yet to make an impact on migration numbers, it has already achieved key political aims for Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.
On 27 January, the Italian government embarked on a third attempt to send a group of migrants to Albania to process their asylum claims which, as with previous attempts, was blocked by a court. As a result, the implementation of the deal between Italy and Albania to allow asylum seekers to be sent to Albania for processing is again deadlocked.
The agreement is based on a Memorandum of Understanding signed by Italy and Albania in 2023. This envisioned the establishment of two detention centres under Italian jurisdiction in Albania to host asylum seekers rescued in the Mediterranean and where asylum applications would be processed using an accelerated procedure. Pending the existence of repatriation agreements with countries of origin, rejected asylum seekers would be repatriated. This deal is unprecedented in Europe and differs from previous models, such as the EU-Turkey arrangement or the UK’s failed “Rwanda scheme”, in that it does not transfer jurisdictional responsibility to the third country.
A political disaster?
The agreement has drawn significant criticism. Italian opposition parties, NGOs and experts have raised concerns about its implications for migrants’ rights. Albanian opposition parties have also claimed the deal undermines Albanian sovereignty. Experts have also highlighted the broader neo-colonial narrative underlying the deal, which was framed as a gesture of “historical friendship” and as Albania’s repayment of a “debt” to Italy for receiving thousands of Albanians in the 1990s. This echoes Italy’s colonial past, when similar rhetoric masked exploitation and oppression.
Others have criticised the deal from a more utilitarian perspective. The deal would apply to 12,000 asylum seekers annually, a small fraction of those crossing the Mediterranean, and is projected to cost over €830 million, nine times higher than the cost of integrating asylum seekers in Italy. Moreover, given the very low repatriation rates and Italy’s obligation to “take back” migrants who cannot be repatriated – whether recognised refugees or rejected asylum seekers – the vast majority of migrants housed in Albania would ultimately be transferred to Italy. Matteo Villa estimates that, even under full implementation of the deal, only 2% of migrants crossing the Mediterranean would never set foot on Italian soil.
The deal has also encountered significant legal and operational obstacles, preventing its implementation. In November 2024, the transfer of the first migrants was blocked by rulings from an Italian court in Rome. Judges argued that the scheme could only legally apply to migrants coming from technically “safe countries”, but none of the primary countries of origin of migrants crossing the Mediterranean can be defined as such.
The government transferred legal competence to the Court of Appeals, which maintained a similar legal interpretation. Most Italian staff were returned to Italy, and the detention centres were reportedly being used to house stray dogs. The government subsequently brought the case to the European Court of Justice. The situation has led some commentators to label the policy “a political disaster” for the Italian government. But is this really a policy failure? And what might happen next?
Risks and goals
The first question worth asking is why the Italian government chose to embark on such a risky agreement and what the real goals of the policy are. One possible explanation is that the Italian government genuinely believed the agreement could be easily implemented. This assumption may reflect an underestimation of the challenges involved, including legal constraints. Public policy scholars have documented numerous instances where policy implementation fails due to inaccurate predictions.
More likely, the Italian government knew that implementing the agreement would be difficult but saw political benefits in the attempt. The deal kept the issue of asylum seekers in the public discourse, benefiting right-wing parties. It also allowed the government to demonstrate its commitment to “solving the migration problem” and to send strong “control signals” to the public.
This was key during a period marked by rising asylum flows and when the government decided to expand work visas for migrants in response to pressure from businesses. In this context, legal hurdles presented an opportunity to blame liberal judges. Previous studies suggest that such a narrative aligns closely with the ideology of populist parties, whose support is often built on portraying liberal elites as a primary adversary.
The agreement might also have been intended to achieve foreign policy objectives, particularly at the EU level. These might include keeping the political attention high on Europe’s southern border, or sparking a conversation and building support for a new European approach to asylum seekers, within the ongoing debates about implementing the New Pact on Migration and Asylum.
From a technical perspective, the Italy-Albania agreement is undoubtedly a policy failure as it has not produced any concrete results, despite the significant financial investment. However, its political objectives have largely been achieved. In 2024, migration remained a highly visible and salient issue in Italy. And even with persistently high migration flows, the government successfully maintained control of the migration narrative, which yielded political gains as the right-wing coalition increased its vote share in the 2024 European elections. Moreover, the agreement allowed the government to set the stage for a public confrontation with the judges while it is pushing for a contested reform of the judicial system.
Indeed at the EU level, unlike Matteo Salvini’s 2018 border policies, Giorgia Meloni’s approach has won plaudits and been highlighted as a potential model by prominent figures, including Ursula von der Leyen. The European Commission is expected to include the creation of “return hubs” similar to the Albanian centres in a legislative proposal before the next European Council meeting in March. Notably, the UNHCR agreed to monitor the implementation of the agreement to ensure the protection of fundamental rights in the Albanian centres, legitimising Meloni’s strategy.
What might happen next?
At least three potential scenarios can be identified. First, the constraints posed by the courts could potentially be overcome, allowing the Italy-Albania agreement to be fully implemented. This will only concern a small number of people and is unlikely to deter migrants from attempting to reach Italy, as research has demonstrated for several restrictive border policies.
In this sense, the Italian government’s emphasis on the expected deterrence effect of the Albania deal seems to point to the persistence of biased views on the causes of migration among policymakers. However, the implementation of the agreement would represent a significant political success for the government. Images of migrants detained in Albanian centres could be leveraged by government parties to bolster their narrative. The appearance of control may hold greater political significance than concrete actions to halt migration flows.
A second scenario would involve the continuation of the current status quo, with repeated attempts by the government to send asylum seekers to Albania, met by renewed constraints imposed by the courts. This scenario bears striking similarities to the UK’s Rwanda deal, where years of discussion failed to result in actual implementation, but provided opportunities to shift the blame for persistent migration flows onto liberal judges and elites, while also ensuring that migration remained a highly salient issue in public discourse.
A third, less likely scenario would involve the Italian government abandoning the plan altogether. Such a development could be triggered only by significant changes in the composition of the government, such as Matteo Salvini being appointed as the new Minister of the Interior following his acquittal in the Open Arms trial.
Salvini might pivot the government’s strategy toward a more confrontational approach with NGOs operating in the Mediterranean, as done in 2018. Meloni is unlikely to cede control of the Interior Ministry to Salvini – an ally but also a competitor on the right. However, some commentators argue she might be forced to concede in exchange for political compensation related to upcoming regional elections.
Each of these scenarios could provide short-term political benefits for the government. Only the longer-term implications would present more challenges for Meloni, as the experience of the UK-Rwanda deal suggests.
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: European Union
