Ana Cardoso (PhD candidate at the School of Law of University of Minho)
I.
The European Union (EU) is one of the most active actors in the field of environmental protection worldwide.[1] However, today some of the EU’s most important partners – namely the United States of America (USA) – have adopted highly protectionist positions[2] which aim to push forth economic growth without any consideration for its environmental consequences or international commitments.[3]
The issue has been so controversial, that Bloomberg Philanthropies has announced it will step in to cover the USA’s contribution to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), given that the country had been responsible for funding around 21% of the organisation’s budget, and its withdrawal would mean a severe disruption to environmental protection actions all around the planet.[4]
Additionally, Russia’s acts of continued aggression against Ukraine have emphasised the EU’s energetic dependency on unreliable partners making the need to boost the EU’s own energy autonomy more apparent, which the Commission proposes to do through renewables, energy efficiency and other European Green Deal (EGD) policies.[5]
This forces the EU to focus its efforts on other jurisdictions, being increasingly important to stay focused on the path of environmental protection.
The political agreement reached in December 2024 by the EU and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) on new commitments towards sustainability, was a decisive step forward for the realisation of EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement (EMTA). After two decades of back-and-forth, complex and convoluted negotiations, the creation of a market of nearly 800 million citizens could finally be a reality.[6]
However, concerns with the environmental implications of the EMTA, coupled with opposition from farmers and indigenous peoples, as well as problems arising from the asymmetries between developed and developing nations, faded the initial support for the trade deal, particularly within the EU.[7]
The EGD and the European Climate Law (ECL) establish objectives of climate neutrality for the EU by 2050, which means reducing emissions by 55% until 2030, investing in green technologies, and protecting natural habitats. Every EU policy and agreement must contribute to these objectives.[8]
The global environmental effects of international trade are complex, multifaceted and cannot be overlooked when designing and implementing trade policy instruments.[9] Thus, this article aims to assess if the implementation of EMTA aligns with the environmental commitments assumed by the EU and if it could be an example of the EU’s ability to positively influence other jurisdictions in environmental matters.
II.
Environmental values are expressly enshrined in the Treaties, with Article 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) establishing that the policies of the Union must always be informed by environmental protection requirements, especially with regard to the promotion of sustainable development.
With the adoption of the EGD, in December 2019, the EU consolidated its frontline position in the field of environmental protection. The EGD aims to make Europe a more sustainable, modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement, decoupling economic growth from resource use, and ensuring that no person or place is left behind.
It has two main axes: i) promoting the efficient use of resources, moving towards a clean and circular economy, and ii) restoring biodiversity and reducing pollution. To this end, the EU proposes to invest in environmentally friendly technologies, support industries to innovate, decarbonise the energy sector, work with international partners to improve global environmental standards, etc.[10]
In 2021, the ECL Regulation was adopted, writing into law the goal set out in the EGD, thus setting a 2030 greenhouse gas reduction of 55% compared to 1990 levels [Article 4(1)], an objective which is binding for both the EU and its Member States,[11] and must be achieved in the domestic market and throughout the economy.[12]
The objectives of the ECL are to set the long-term common direction for meeting the 2050 climate neutrality objective through all policies, in a socially fair and cost-efficient manner, creating a system for monitoring progress and taking further action if needed, by providing predictability for investors and other economic actors, and ensuring irreversibility on climate neutrality.[13]
As the Draghi Report alerted, Europe’s ambitious climate targets must be matched by a coherent plan to achieve them, otherwise there is a risk that decarbonisation could run contrary not only to competitiveness and growth,[14] but also to the EU’s objective to be at the forefront of the green transition.
Taking this into account, it is important that the EU maintains focus when it comes to environmental protection. Allowing deviation due to other, even if no less important, concerns – namely, of an economic nature – could mean the “death” of the green transition.[15]
As such, it is recognised that trade policy cannot operate in isolation from environmental policy. Production and transportation accounts for 20-30% of global carbon emissions, and trade in various commodities is responsible for the degradation of critical environmental resources. Thus, any trade agreement negotiated by the EU will have to take into account issues related to trade, environment and development, trying to achieve a difficult balance between economic needs and environmental protection.[16]
III.
Founded in 1991, the Mercosur represents one of the EU’s most important economic partners today. Negotiations for the EMTA begun in 2000, however, due to substantial differences between both parties regarding a number of internally significant issues – namely agricultural trade, services, the opening of public purchasing markets and political changes – did not allow negotiators to make enough progress to reach an agreement, which lead to multiple suspensions and restarting of negotiation efforts.
Finally, in 2019, the “agreement in principle” was signed. A negotiated result, with its benefits and challenges, which raised significant criticism, particularly from some EU agricultural associations and civil society groups that expressed their strong opposition due to possible competitiveness issues with Mercosur products, environmental concerns and lack of alignment with European climate goals. Consequently, in December 2024, a new agreement in principle was reached between the EU and the four founding members of the Mercosur, reinforcing the latter’s commitments under the Trade and Sustainable Development pillar (TDS), in order to respond to some of the challenges of 2019.[17]
By mid-2025, the European Commission is expected to present to the Council – following the legal review and translation of the agreed trade deal – the proposals to sign and conclude the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement.[18]
Thus, two decades of negotiations result in the third largest trade agreement in the world from an economic perspective, representing 21.8 trillion dollars. An agreement strategic for Mercosur to advance the discussion on regulating and adopting important policies to promote environmental sustainability, social responsibility and good corporate governance; and for the EU which, in light of recent political developments, needs strong partnerships that underpin the European economy.[19] According to the Commission, the EMTA will help ensure sustainable access to raw materials, strengthen economic security and support the twin transition, thus projecting European values through detailed obligations on trade and sustainable development.[20]
However, the environmental issue has been one of its main obstacles, with the Agreement ending up foreseeing: i) the commitment to the Paris Agreement without restricting trade; ii) rules for forest management and sustainable fisheries attempting an alignment between environmental concerns and fair trade; iii) unilateral counter-barrier mechanisms, with protection against legislation that harms Brazilian agricultural exports, namely the EU’s anti-deforestation law.[21]
The EU has been at the forefront of efforts to incorporate ecological concerns into its recent trade agreements, namely through: i) Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs), which assess the potential economic, social, and environmental impacts of an agreement; and ii) the chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD), which is now a standard element of the EU’s trade agreements, and in which parties make commitments on environmental and labour protection.[22]
When it comes to the EMTA’s SIA, it has been highly criticised, with civil society organizations declaring it an “extremely brief analysis” that failed to assess the true environmental impacts of the Agreement.[23] Although the final assessment concluded that the EMTA would have a negligible impact on CO2 emissions, it disregarded emissions resulting from changes in agricultural land use and deforestation.[24]
Further, there were several data omissions and a failure to present an assessment of the EMTA’s impact on ecosystems and biodiversity. The report recognised that the EMTA would increase demand in the EU for a number of agricultural products and the impact that these specific products could possibly have on deforestation. But it failed to truly assess the consequences of this potential deforestation and related climate change impacts.
In response, the Commission argued that changes in the internal policies of Mercosur countries were essential to reduce deforestation, and that the TDS chapter of the Agreement could serve as a key driver of these changes.[25]
However, we cannot ignore the fact that between 2005 and 2017 it is estimated that the EU’s global imports accounted for 21% of the total land conversion associated with the international trade in commodities – thus making it the second-largest importer of emissions from land conversion and associated activities.[26]
The Paris Agreement has been recognised as an “essential element” of the EMTA, with Article XX of the publicised agreement document “Paris Agreement as an Essential Element”[27] recognising “that the global threat of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation of all countries to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change in a manner that does not threaten food production, with developed countries continuing to take the lead.” Each Party in the EMTA agrees to remain, in good faith, a party of UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement.
Article XY of the same document establishes that if a Party considers, on the basis of a factual situation, that another has committed a violation of the obligations imposed by the Paris Agreement it may take “appropriate” and “proportionate” measures, which may, as a last resort, include the suspension of the trade agreement, in part or in full.
The vagueness of these key environmental provisions – which is replicated in the TDS chapter – is also highly criticised. Here there is no creation of concrete obligations to achieve an effective reduction of CO2,[28] instead throughout the text there is a sense of back-and-forth in which the Parties “shall take any general or specific measures required to fulfil their obligations.”[29]
The EMTA’s TDS chapter takes a cooperative approach to the issue of sustainable development [Article 1(5)] and aims to establish principles and actions concerning its contextually relevant environmental aspects [Article 1(1)], taking into account the asymmetrical national realities [Article 1(4)(c)], recognising its importance for the welfare of present and future generations [Article 1(2)].
It cannot be ignored that trade relations between developing and developed countries are complex due to their differences in capabilities and growth. This is especially true when it comes to reconciling development objectives with efforts to protect and reduce environmental impacts of trade and economic expansion.
It is important to consider that environmental issues should be a priority from a development perspective, there is a need to reflect under what circumstances environmental trade measures can also promote development, and how to proceed when it comes to fair distribution of the costs of any environmental obligations created by trade agreements.[30]
The implementation of environmental standards related to climate change in Mercosur countries must follow a meticulous strategy of adaptation of industry and the productive sector, based on the cooperation and investment of the EU bloc, in order to avoid losses to companies and possible sanctions on international trade for the Mercosur bloc.[31]
Well, the Annex to the TDS chapter further drives this point home in its Part A. Article A.1(3) brings forth Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration which establishes that environmental standards, management objectives and priorities have to take into account the environmental and developmental context to which they apply.
Moreover, the Parties in the EMTA recognise the differences in their levels of development and national circumstances, while pursuing the integration of sustainable development. The TDS chapter establishes that each Party is the “owner” of its sustainable development policies, priorities and level of protection, as long as they are transparent (Article 3) and consistent with their commitment with current and future multilateral environmental agreements (Article 2) and shall cooperate by exchanging information on their progress and consult with each other on trade-related environmental matters of mutual interest (Article 5). It prescribes that each Party shall promote the positive contribution of trade as a way to lower greenhouse gas emissions and push forth climate-resilient development [Article 6(2)].
Yet, the EMTA does not provide innovative incentives for biodiversity protection and native vegetation preservation. Further mechanisms and policies of land use planning would be necessary to more effectively address all these risks and the multiple challenges brought forth by land-use problems.[32]
The prospective environmental impact of the EMTA is quite significant: a potential increase in deforestation in the Amazon by 25%, which could generate an additional 340 million tons of CO2 over the next ten years.[33]
As such, how does this possible ecological pressure fit into the EU’s environmental commitments, particularly with regard to the requirements of the EGD and the ECL? Civil society organisations argue that the EMTA, as it stands, ends up contributing to the strengthening of industries responsible for the climate crisis and violates EU climate laws.[34]
Despite Articles 7 and 8 recognising the importance of the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, of sustainable forest management and the potentially positive role trade can play in forest restoration and conservation, the EMTA poses a risk to deforestation. Increased bilateral trade in combination with the requirement for a deforestation-free[35] supply chain for certain exported goods will likely lead to increased so-called “indirect deforestation” in the Mercosur region, through the displacement and exchange of agricultural land used for different markets.
The Brazilian Cerrado ends up being one of the regions most affected by these incomplete protection policies. In worrying numbers, land conversion in this area reached the 11.011km2 in 2023.[36] Existing protection policies are only applicable to the Legal Amazon, which has pushed deforestation from the Amazon to the Cerrado, with more than 70% of this region still excluded from zero deforestation efforts today.[37]
Article 13 of the TDS recognises the importance of working together in order to achieve the objectives of sustainable development. Positive projections relating to the potential loss of habitat in the Mercosur territory[38]/[39] hinge on the effectivity of the governance framework established through the commitments and provisions of the EMTA as a tool to delay or even reverse the forecasted land use change resulting from the increased market access to the EU.[40] The problem lays with the fact that these processes of dialogue, exchange of information and cooperation seem rather fragile, being vague and undefined, not providing details on the procedure, aims, priorities and strength of said cooperation.[41]
Further, even though the TDS chapter includes a dispute resolution process in the event of non-compliance by either Party, disputes are to be resolved by a Panel of Experts which does not have sanctioning power, making it a weak instrument.[42]
Additionally, the use of trade sanctions in response to violations of environmental provisions has historically been criticized by developing countries. These countries have argued that, due to the significant discrepancy between the levels of environmental protection between developing and developed countries, only the latter may be capable of making full use of these mechanisms in practice, since they already have a solid environmental protection system in place.[43]
Article A.2(17)(18) of the Annex to the TDS chapter acknowledges that policies must take into account the social and economic challenges of developing countries and their contribution to global food security, accentuating the need for greater support and investment, namely through financial resources, technology transfers and capacity-building.
The financial aspect can be one of the main obstacles for the Agreement to reach its full potential of environmental policy change and climate protection. The lack of an obvious financing structure in this context, without the establishment of specific funds associated with the objectives of the TDS chapter, will only add to the difficulties covered above and make its effectiveness questionable.[44]
IV.
After this analysis, we may conclude that the EMTA has failed to satisfactorily address current ecological challenges, and its implementation brings into question the EU’s ability to meet the objectives set out in the EGD and the ECL. Not only does the EMTA not abide by the EU’s environmental protection framework, it also does not push forward the green transition nor contributes to an irreversible climate neutrality, making its replication undesirable when it comes to trade partnerships with other jurisdictions.
If the impact of trading with Mercosur effectively reaches the prospected levels of CO2 emissions, and leads to increased levels of deforestation in the Amazon and destruction of the Cerrado habitat, if the already large trade flows between the two regions, are increased resulting in an augmented ecological footprint, if problems relating to land conversion come to fruition, it is very unlikely that the Mercosur can meet the expanded European demand for commodities without generating further adverse impacts on nature, even taking into account the push to facilitate, discuss and monitor the effective implementation of the EMTA and the objectives of its TDS chapter (Article 14), as a way to avoid obstacles and environmental constraints.
The conclusion of this “emblematic” agreement could end up undermining the EU’s role in promoting better global governance linked to climate change and sustainable development by restoring and protecting biodiversity and ecosystems, reducing pollution, supporting the global transition of agri-food systems, and promoting efficient use of resources.[45]
However, the reality of the global economy in crisis and the difficult socio-political situation – the so-called “global polycrisis”[46] –, particularly in the EU, will mean a complex balancing act between economic needs and environmental crisis response, for which a solution must be found. Ignoring either aspect will have a detrimental effect in the “European way of life”.[47]
[1] Carlos Abreu Amorim, “Editorial of June 2020”, UNIO EU Law Journal – The Official Blog, June 2020, accessed January 28, 2025, https://officialblogofunio.com/2020/06/01/editorial-of-june-2020.
[2] Thomas Moller-Nielsen, “Trump accuses EU of treating US ‘very, very unfairly’”, Euractiv, January 23, 2025, accessed January 28, 2025, https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/trump-accuses-eu-of-treating-us-very-very-unfairly/.
[3] “Putting America first in international environmental agreements”, The White House, January 20, 2025, accessed February 07, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/putting-america-first-in-international-environmental-agreements/.
[4] Valerie Volcovici, “Michael Bloomberg steps in to help fund UN climate body after Trump withdrawal”, Reuters, January 23, 2025, accessed February 07, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/bloomberg-philanthropy-cover-us-climate-dues-after-paris-withdrawal-2025-01-23/.
[5] European Commission, “A European Green Deal – Striving to be the first climate neutral continent”, accessed January 28, 2025, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en.
[6] European Commission, “Factsheet: EU-Mercosur partnership agreement”, accessed January 29, 2025, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eu-mercosur-agreement/factsheet-eu-mercosur-partnership-agreement_en.
[7] Susan E.M. Cesar de Oliveira et al., “The European Union-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement as a tool for
environmentally sustainable land use governance”, Environmental Science and Policy, v. 161 (2024): 2, accessed January 24, 2025, doi: 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103875.
[8] European Commission, “Climate action and the Green Deal”, accessed January 29, 2025, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/climate-action-and-green-deal_en.
[9] James Harrison and Sophia Paulini, “Reinventing trade, environment and development interlinkages: lessons from the EU–Mercosur Association Agreement”, Journal of International Economic Law (2024): 1-2, accessed January 27, 2025, doi: 10.1093/jiel/jgae044.
[10] European Commission, “A European Green Deal – Striving to be the first climate neutral continent”, accessed January 28, 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/know4pol/items/664852.
[11] Christian Rusche and Thilo Schaefer, “Is the EU Fit for 55 and Beyond?”, Intereconomics, v. 59, no. 2 (2024): 77, accessed January 29, 2025, doi: 10.2478/ie-2024-0017.
[12] European Commission: Directorate-General for Climate Action, Going climate-neutral by 2050 – A strategic long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral EU economy, (Luxembourg: Publications Office, 2019), https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2834/02074.
[13] Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)
[14] Mario Draghi, The future of European competitiveness – Part A | A competitiveness strategy for Europe, September 2024, 6, accessed January 29, 2025, https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en.
[15] European Commission, “Green transition”, accessed January 29, 2025, https://reform-support.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/green-transition_en.
[16] James Harrison and Sophia Paulini, “Reinventing trade, environment and development interlinkages: lessons from the EU–Mercosur Association Agreement”, Journal of International Economic Law (2024): 1-2, accessed January 27, 2025, doi: 10.1093/jiel/jgae044.
[17] Gabriel Mato, Jordi Cañas, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, “Legislative Train Schedule – EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement”, European Parliament, accessed December 15, 2024, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-international-trade-inta/file-eu-mercosur-association-agreement?sid=8701.
[18] European Parliament, “Ratification scenarios for the EU Mercosur agreement”, Think Tank – European Parliament, accessed December 18, 2024, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2024)767166.
[19] Maria Luiza Araujo, “Acordo Mercosul-UE cria uma das maiores parcerias econômicas do mundo; conheça outras alianças”, CNN, December 06, 2024, accessed December 14, 2024, https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/economia/macroeconomia/acordo-mercosul-ue-cria-uma-das-maiores-parcerias-economicas-do-mundo-conheca-outras-aliancas/.
[20] European Commission, “Questions and answers on the EU-Mercosur partnership agreement”, December 29, de 2024, accessed December 14, 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_24_6245.
[21] Câmara do Comércio, “Confira os principais pontos do acordo Mercosul-União Europeia”, BRICS MERCOSUL, accessed December 14, de 2024, https://bricsmercosul.com.br/confira-os-principais-pontos-do-acordo-mercosul-uniao-europeia/.
[22] Harrison and Paulini, “Reinventing trade”, 1-2.
[23] ClientEarth, Conservation International, Fern and the Veblen Institute, “Comments on the Draf Final Report/Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) in Support of the Association Agreement Negotiations between the European Union (EU) and Mercosur,” August 05, 2020, accessed January 27, 2025, https://www.veblen-institute.org/IMG/pdf/sia_mercosur_-_ngo_comments.pdf. “ClientEarth, Fern and Conservation International, Joint Reply to the Draft Interim Report of the Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement, October 30, 2019”, January 28, 2020, accessed January 27, 2025, https://www.clientearth.org/latest/documents/clientearth-fern-and-conservation-international-joint-reply-to-the-draft-interim-report-of-the-sustainability-impact-assessment-of-the-eu-mercosur-trade-agreement-october-30-2019/.
[24] Harrison and Paulini, “Reinventing trade”, 5.
[25] Harrison and Paulini, “Reinventing trade”, 5.
[26] Oliveira et al., “The European”, 3.
[27] European Commission, “EU-Mercosur: Text of the agreement”, accessed January 29, 2025, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eu-mercosur-agreement/text-agreement_en.
[28] Luciana Ghiotto and Javier Echaide, Analysis of the agreement between the European Union and the Mercosur (Berlin, Beunos Aires and Brussels: The Greens/EFA and PowerShift e.V., 2019), 64-66.
[29] European Commission, “EU-Mercosur: Text of the agreement”, accessed January 28, 2025, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eu-mercosur-agreement/text-agreement_en. CIRCABC, “Paris Agreement as an essential element”, accessed January 28, 2025, https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/09242a36-a438-40fd-a7af-fe32e36cbd0e/library/e93f0789-4255-427e-8f45-f9d5cce09ed7/details?download=true.
[30] Harrison and Paulini, “Reinventing trade”, 1-2.
[31] Moreira, “Uma análise”, 27.
[32] Oliveira et al., “The European”, 8.
[33] Paola Nano, “EU-Mercosur Trade Deal: Concerns from the EU Slow Food Network”, Slow Food, December 04, 2024, accessed December 14, 2024, https://www.slowfood.com/blog-and-news/eu-mercosur-concerns-from-eu-slow-food-network/.
[34] Greenpeace, “Toxic EU Mercosur trade deal agreed”, December 06, 2024, accessed January 24, 2025, https://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/issues/climate-energy/47350/toxic-eu-mercosur-trade-deal-agreed/. Climate Alliance, “What’s behind the EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement”, accessed January 24, 2025, https://www.climatealliance.org/activities/advocacy/european-policy/eu-mercosur.html.
[35] See Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010.
[36] Oliveira et al., “The European”, 3.
[37] Richard Fuchs et al., “The EU’s new anti-deforestation law has severe loopholes that could be exploited by the forthcoming EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement”, Environ. Res. Lett., v. 19 (2024): 1-2 and 4.
[38] Eugenio Arima, Paulo Barreto, Farzad Taheripour, Angel Aguiar, “Dynamic Amazonia: The EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement and Deforestation”, Land, v. 10, no. 11 (2021), accessed January 29, 2025, doi: 10.3390/land10111243.
[39] Jesus Alberto Mercado Cordova, Yoonmo Koo, “Trade-induced land-use transitions and greenhouse gas emissions: The case of the EU-Mercosur free-trade agreement”, Journal of Cleaner Production, v. 429 (2023), accessed January 29, 2025, doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.139327.
[40] Oliveira et al., “The European”, 4.
[41] Harrison and Paulini, “Reinventing trade”, 5-6.
[42] Ghiotto, Echaide, Analysis, 64-66.
[43] Alberto do Amaral Júnior, Alebe Linhares Mesquita, “The New Rules on Trade and Environment Linkage in Preferential Trade Agreements”, Brazilian Journal of International Law, v. 14, no. 2 (2017): 406, accessed January 29, 2025, doi: 10.5102/rdi.v14i2.4523.
[44] James Harrison et al., “Labour Standards Provisions in EU Free Trade Agreements: Reflections on the European Commission’s Reform Agenda”, World Trade Review, v. 18, no. 4 (2019): 651, accessed January 29, 2025, doi: 10.1017/S1474745618000204.
[45] Ghiotto, Echaide, Analysis, 73.
[46] Meaning the “causal entanglement of crises in multiple global systems in ways that significantly degrade humanity’s prospects”. Michael Lawrence et al., “Global polycrisis: the causal mechanisms of crisis entanglement”, Global Sustainability, v. 7 (2024): 2, doi: 10.1017/sus.2024.1.
[47] The ideas in this post will be further developed in a new article to be published in the next issue of UNIO Journal.
Picture credit: by Min An, on pexels.com.
