The German radical right has mobilised around a working class identity that pits hard-working “makers” against parasitic “takers”. Linus Westheuser and Thomas Lux argue that for the left to win back support from the working class, it will have to revive its own tradition of class politics.
This month’s federal election in Germany will unfold against the backdrop of deep anxieties over economic stagnation and the lasting impact of an energy inflation shock that widened inequalities. In the working and lower middle classes hit hardest, this feeling of crisis has boosted support for the radical right Alternative for Germany (AfD).
In the European elections in June 2024, polls showed that one out of three workers voted for the AfD. That was more than the combined share of all four parties on the left – the German Social Democrats (SPD), Greens, Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance and the Left Party – and only slightly less than the combined vote for the two traditional catch-all parties, the conservative CDU and the SPD. At least in this election, voting radical right was the most common type of electoral behaviour in the German working class after abstention.
In a recent study, we take a closer look at the way in which class consciousness and belonging enter this equation. Does having a sense of class identity immunise working class voters against right-wing extremism? Do the Social Democrats or other parties on the left still act as expressions of solidarity between working people? Or has class consciousness ceased to play a role in the politics of post-industrial society altogether?
Our results suggest that class consciousness still matters for voting today, but that the political left has lost its monopoly over working class identity. In our interpretation, there are now two starkly opposed understandings of class belonging that compete for political hegemony.
A left-wing understanding views class as a product of the inevitable clash between the interests of employers and employees, the majority of ordinary wage-earners and the very rich. By contrast, the radical right mobilises a producerist and welfare chauvinistic form of working class identity, one that pits hard-working “makers” against parasitic “takers”, such as migrants and benefit recipients. We argue that to halt the far right capture of the working class, the left needs to revive its own tradition of class politics.
Class consciousness as identity, interests and status
The question of how class shapes voting has long been a central concern in political sociology, albeit one that had somewhat fallen out of fashion until very recently. Drawing on a classical canon of research including authors like Michael Mann and Erik Olin Wright, we distinguish between three dimensions of class consciousness: a) class identity, i.e. the extent to which individuals identify as part of the working class; b) class interests, i.e. the extent to which they situate their own economic interests as employees in an antagonism with employers and corporate interests; and c) low subjective status, i.e. whether they see themselves on the disadvantaged side of social hierarchies of esteem.
Along these three dimensions, we map how different forms of class consciousness are associated with voting for the three major blocs of German politics: the centre-left (SPD, Greens, Left), the centre-right (CDU, FDP) and the radical right (AfD).
Two competing visions of class belonging
One of our key findings is that people who identify as part of the working class are more likely to vote for the radical right. This contradicts traditional assumptions that a sense of working class identity translates into left-wing political alignment. Instead, the radical right has successfully developed its own narrative of working class identity.
It positions itself as the defender of hard-working native producers burdened by taxes feeding politicians above and undeserving groups such as welfare recipients and migrants below. Populist, producerist and welfare chauvinist narratives of class identity like these have proven effective in mobilising working-class voters around exclusionary nationalism and a defence of their respectability against outsider groups. Rather than redistributive policies or increased political strength as a class, the radical right offers workers the symbolic reward of punching down.
That the German left seems to have lost its ties with working class identity is particularly problematic because this subjective sense of identity still closely tracks respondents’ objective positions. Between 70% and 80% of those whose jobs and qualifications placed them in the working class also self-identified as part of the working class, a much higher percentage than what is found among professionals or the self-employed.
In contrast to the right-wing inflection of class identity, class interest consciousness tacks left. Those eager to side with employees and unions against the power of corporations and employers remain more likely to vote for the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Left Party.
In one of the items used to measure class interest consciousness, survey respondents were asked to imagine a labour dispute over pay and working conditions and to state whether they would root for the workers, for the management or for a compromise between both. Citizens who clearly sided with the workers and their unions, as well as those who criticised the power of corporations, were much more likely to support centre-left parties.
Political implications for the left
Notably, this form of class consciousness is not only strong among industrial workers but also among the feminised class of service workers as well as parts of the professional class. Sociocultural experts, academically trained employees working in education, culture or public services were also among the most likely to exhibit a consciousness of antagonistic class interests and a willingness to side with the employees’ side.
This is significant because it indicates that class interest consciousness could be an element uniting the new and old bases of the left: progressive parts of the educated middle class, as well as workers in manufacturing and services. An emphasis on collective empowerment and a critique of inequality and excesses of corporate power could link workers’ sense of unjust domination with egalitarian and universalistic values central to middle class politics.
In general, our findings suggest that to counter the radical right’s growing popularity in the working class, left-wing parties in Germany and beyond should reclaim the language of class politics and economic antagonism that formed the heart of the left tradition. There is unrealised potential for mobilising alliances around the common interests of wage-earners against those of employers and the rich, as well as around the conflict between public interests and private profits. Rekindling conflicts over wealth redistribution, labour rights and corporate accountability could help reassert the relevance of left-wing politics for working-class voters without losing the middle class.
If the centre-left is to have any chance of prevailing in today’s hostile political conditions, it needs to ensure that the conflict between the interests of the top and those of the rest, as well as the legitimate demands of the less well-off majority are at the heart of public debates. To realise this potential, left parties need to accentuate and seek out these conflicts rather than hide them.
And they need to make much clearer in whose name and for whose interests they are fighting, and against which competing interests their programme will have to be implemented. As Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez once put it, “if you try to please everyone, no one will vote for you”. If left parties fail to do so, the radical right will continue to consolidate its hold over working-class voters.
As Germany navigates a crucial election, dynamics of class and class consciousness will play a decisive, albeit often hidden and underestimated role in shaping the country’s political future. The challenge for the left is to articulate a vision of economic justice that can counter the divisive politics of the radical right. Whether it can rise to this challenge will determine the trajectory of German politics in the years to come.
For more information, see the authors’ accompanying report published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: European Union
