If Donald Trump wants to successfully resolve the Russia-Ukraine war, he will have to take Brussels and London into account, write George Scutaru and Peter Watkins.
The whirlwind of events the past few weeks have fundamentally changed the dynamics of transatlantic relations. At the heart of the debate is the future of Ukraine. President Trump has been clear that he wants a rapid cessation of hostilities in Ukraine essentially to allow his administration to focus on other issues considered more important to the US, such as strategic competition with China.
But Russia’s war on Ukraine is not just a conflict between two states. According to President Putin, the conflict in Ukraine will reset the “new global security architecture”. For Putin, the conflict is a pretext for negotiating the division of the world into spheres of influence; he is obsessed with negotiating directly with the Americans and symbolically returning Moscow and Washington to Soviet-era parity.
Bringing Europe back in
A key member of his entourage, Nikolai Patrushev, the former secretary of the Security Council, has emphasised that negotiations on Ukraine should be between the Americans and the Russians only, “there is nothing to discuss with the UK or the European Union”. Discussions limited to this format, with Ukraine given a list of what to accept and Europe given a list of what to pay, is no way to secure a robust and sustainable peace agreement.
An agreement that would, in reality, be a capitulation, with Russia taking new territory and Ukraine accepting defeat, would not only be immoral but also difficult to implement. President Zelenskyy could face political suicide, with a large part of the Ukrainian armed forces and Ukrainian society unwilling to accept a humiliating peace for Ukraine.
The EU and the UK are aware that they will have to assume more of the costs of stabilising Ukraine’s economy, for rebuilding and for sustaining a credible deterrent posture for the Ukrainian armed forces, but they will resist being reduced to the role of a cash machine. If the US wants to successfully resolve this conflict, then it will have to take Brussels and London into account.
Putin’s plan
The US must consider not only a ceasefire but also some mechanisms to ensure that Putin does not attack Ukraine again in a few years’ time. This war effectively began in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of Crimea, moving to its second episode – the full-scale invasion – in 2022. If Putin does not face serious deterrence and containment measures, he will restart the war within a few years.
Putin is 72 years old and is running out of biological time. Putin wants to “solve the Ukrainian problem” in his own way by destroying Ukraine. To destroy Ukraine, the first step would be to cut off Ukraine’s access to the sea. His goal will remain to conquer the entire Ukrainian littoral along the Black Sea and reach the mouth of the Danube.
Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa are the cities that must be conquered to suffocate Ukraine economically. A land bridge to Transnistria would make it possible for Russia not only to annex this separatist region but also to occupy the Republic of Moldova. That country has only a small army and no strategic depth. In such a scenario, Romania, a NATO and EU state, would have 850 kilometres of direct border with the Russian Federation, the second longest border of a NATO state after Finland.
This situation would significantly worsen not only Romania’s security but also that of the entire southern part of NATO’s eastern flank. Russia would be able to control the mouth of the Danube – the second gateway to the Black Sea after the Bosphorus – and undermine many development plans in the Black Sea region, especially those concerning connectivity and the exploitation of energy resources. Ukraine is a major exporter of cereals worldwide, as is Russia, and Romania is also an important player, so an even tenser security situation in the Black Sea would affect global food security.
A robust peace
To prevent a further attack on Ukraine, economic pressure on Russia must continue, especially on its oil exports, so that the Russian war machine does not quickly recover. Ukraine’s armed forces must be helped to remain a credible deterrent, and the European defence industry must increase production not only to enhance Europe’s defence capability but also to help Ukraine in the event of further aggression.
Robust security arrangements must be made. A coalition of the willing of European states, preferably led by the UK and France as Europe’s nuclear powers, should send forces to key cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Odesa to deter a Russian attack. The Republic of Moldova’s airspace should also be protected by European allies.
Well-armed Ukrainian troops should be stationed in the vicinity of any demilitarised zone, with strong fortifications, to minimise the effectiveness of any renewed Russian attack. Territories occupied by Russia must not be internationally recognised as belonging to Moscow, so Ukraine can remain hopeful that it will be able to regain its territory under better circumstances.
Even if it is difficult to reach political consensus on Ukraine’s membership of NATO, the alliance must continue to insist that Ukraine has the right to decide for itself which alliances it wants to belong to and state that its doors remain open. At the same time, Ukraine’s accession to the EU must have a clear path, which – while depending on Ukraine’s reforms – has clear milestones to give Ukrainians a prospect of belonging to this organisation. Similarly, Moldova’s path towards the EU must be strongly supported.
The scale of the challenge
The US, together with the UK and the EU, must first and foremost ensure that Ukraine remains a stable democracy with a functioning economy that will recover after the conflict ends. Maintaining a strong Ukrainian army, rebuilding the country and rebuilding the economy are big and costly tasks. Between 70 and 90 billion USD will be needed annually across these three areas. And we are not talking about a financial effort that will end soon.
A further task will be the reintegration of the more than 1.5 million veterans who will face major challenges after the war: returning to civilian life, overcoming medical and psychological problems, and social reintegration. People must not be allowed, out of desperation, to become part of criminal structures which pose a threat to the stability of Ukraine, as well as to Ukraine’s neighbours and the whole of Europe. We have the example of many veterans of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, who, after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, became part of mafia structures.
A politically, economically and socially unstable Ukraine would not be in the interests of either Europe or the US, because this instability would make it very vulnerable to destabilising actions by Russia. These could eventually culminate in a new military attack and also open the way to a strong economic presence by China.
Absent continuing western assistance, and to avoid economic collapse, Ukraine would be forced to accept other offers of help, and China would take advantage of the situation. A strong Chinese economic presence in Ukraine would strengthen China’s position in the middle of Europe, affecting the security interests of both the US and Europe.
The end of the war in Ukraine and the peace process must be the expression of effective collaboration between the US and its European allies. We must avoid another Munich Agreement that would satisfy Putin for the moment, but which would merely feed his appetite for new conquests.
Putin must be stopped here and now, otherwise we will have to manage together, Europeans and Americans, a much more aggressive Russia in the future. And this wouldn’t be the only problem, because China, Iran and North Korea could also show increased aggression, encouraged by Russian success against the democratic world.
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: European Union
