Ana Carcau (master’s student in European Union Law at the School of Law of University of Minho)
In early 2025, Greenpeace International initiated legal proceedings before Dutch courts seeking compensation for all the damages and costs suffered from a series of abusive lawsuits filed against it by the US-based fossil fuel pipeline company, Energy Transfer.[1] These lawsuits, strategically designed to intimidate and silence public participation, are what we now widely refer to as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). They exemplify what has been described as “punishment by process”: a way of weaponizing legal systems to suppress dissent rather than to seek justice.[2]
The legal battle between Greenpeace and Energy Transfer is far from recent. It all dates back to 2017, when Energy Transfer began targeting Greenpeace entities in the United States, as well as Greenpeace International, in the aftermath of the 2016 Indigenous-led protests against Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). At the time, Energy Transfer alleged that Greenpeace had orchestrated the protests and sought to hold the organisation liable for damages.[3]
The first attempt took the form of a federal lawsuit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, a statute traditionally used to prosecute organised crime. The court, however, was not convinced since the judge concluded that the evidence fell short of what was needed to establish a RICO enterprise, and the case was dismissed.[4] Not deterred, Energy Transfer filed a new case in North Dakota state court, now framed as a mix of defamation, conspiracy, and other torts. This time the case progressed, despite serious concerns over its merit.
This case takes an even more relevant dimension from a European legal perspective since North Dakota does not have Anti-SLAPP legislation, meaning Greenpeace could not benefit from procedural safeguards that might otherwise have enabled the swift dismissal of the case or full recovery of legal costs. Adding to the severity of the situation, the verdict delivered by the jury in February 2025 found the Greenpeace entities liable for more than 660 million USD. For Greenpeace, this ruling represents a catastrophic outcome – one that risks reinforcing a dangerous precedent: that organisations engaging in public protest can be crushed under the weight of disproportionate litigation.[5]
What makes the lawsuit in the Netherlands particularly significant is that it could become the first real test of the effectiveness of the recently adopted Directive (EU) 2024/1069,[6] commonly referred to as the Anti-SLAPP Directive. Although the Directive is still in the process of being transposed by Member States (transposition limit date is May 7, 2026),[7] its provisions may already have a powerful impact on how European courts respond to transnational attempts at silencing journalists, activists and civil society organizations.
SLAPPs are not just legal actions, they are tools of suppression, i.e. lawsuits initiated not necessarily to win, but to exhaust. These cases create what legal scholars have dubbed a “chilling effect”, which means that there is a general goal of deterring not just the target of the SLAPP, but also others from participating in public debate for fear of retaliation.[8] This goal can manifest itself in many forms: from a strategic choice of jurisdiction, to relying on one or more fully or partially unfounded claims, or initiating multiple proceedings on similar matters, among many others.[9]
Taking this into account the Anti-SLAPP Directive was adopted in April 2024 as a response to the growing concern that abusive litigation was being used across the EU to deter public scrutiny and democratic debate.[10] Its primary goal is to shield journalists, human right defenders, academics and civil society organizations from meritless lawsuits that are filed with the intention of silencing or punishing participation in matters of public interest.[11] Typically brought by powerful individuals or corporations, their aim is to drain the resources and morale of those who speak out on issues of public interest.[12] This goal is explicitly recognised in Article 4(3) of the Directive, which highlights that SLAPPs are intended not to defend legitimate rights but to restrict, penalise or otherwise burden public participation.
The Directive applies only to civil and commercial matters with cross-border implications, and it introduces a set of procedural safeguards designed to discourage and deter SLAPPs. It also covers interim and precautionary measures, as well as counteractions, ensuring that procedural abuse is addressed at all stages of litigation.[13] Among its key innovations are the provision of security, the possibility for courts to dismiss manifestly unfounded claims at an early stage, and the imposition of remedies against abusive court proceedings against public participation – including the awarding of costs, penalties, or other equally effective appropriate measures – against those who engage in abusive litigation.[14]
To begin with, there is the possibility for courts to require the claimant to provide a security covering estimated legal costs. This may include the defendant’s legal representation expenses and potential compensation for damages.[15] While functioning as a precautionary measure, the imposition of security must be balanced against the claimant’s right of access to justice. It should only be applied where there are sufficient indications that the proceedings are likely to be abusive, without prejudging the outcome on the merits.[16]
The early dismissal of manifestly unfounded claims allows courts to reject abusive proceedings at the earliest possible stage, sparing the defendant from unnecessary legal burdens and procedural delays.[17] Although taken early in the process, this decision must be properly reasoned and is subject to appeal, as is the refusal to grant dismissal.[18] The purpose is to ensure that clearly abusive lawsuits do not advance, thereby reinforcing procedural efficiency and access to justice.
Lastly, the Directive provides for the imposition of remedies against abusive court proceedings. These may take the form of cost orders, requiring the claimant to bear all procedural expenses, including the defendant’s legal fees, unless deemed excessive.[19] Other effective sanctions may include the payment of compensation for damages or the publication of the court’s decision.[20] These remedies must be proportionate and dissuasive, with the aim of discouraging abusive litigation practices that threaten public participation.[21]
Importantly, the Directive also upholds the principle of effective judicial protection, ensuring that procedural tools do not infringe the right of access to justice.[22] It draws directly from Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and emphasises that the implementation of such tools relies not only on legislation, but also on the active role of national courts as “functionally European” courts.[23] They are the first line of defence against SLAPPs, and their ability to interpret and apply EU law is vital for ensuring that these safeguards are more than just words on paper.
Now, while much attention has been paid to these internal procedural safeguards, the Directive also addresses a less visible but equally pressing threat: abusive decisions originating from outside the EU. This is precisely where the case brought in Dutch courts by Greenpeace International – based in the Netherlands – becomes especially relevant. Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Directive, courts in Member States are empowered to refuse recognition or enforcement of third-country judgements when those decisions are manifestly unfounded or abusive. In other words, if a foreign judgement results from a SLAPP, EU courts can decline to give it effect within their jurisdiction. This provision is crucial in an increasingly globalised legal landscape, where transnational litigation can easily be weaponised to silence actors protected under EU law.[24]
The Greenpeace lawsuit offers a unique opportunity to see how these mechanisms might play out in practice. The Dutch courts, by assessing the legitimacy of the SLAPPs brought by a non-EU actor, will essentially be pioneering a form of judicial resistance against abusive litigation tactics imported from abroad. Beyond its legal complexity, this case is symbolic since it signals that civil society is no longer willing to play defence and puts European courts and institutions to the test: will they live up to the ambitions of the Anti-SLAPP Directive? Only time will tell, but one thing is certain: the outcome of this case will echo far beyond the courtroom, it could shape how Europe protects those who dare to speak up.
[1] Greenpeace, “Greenpeace International files lawsuit against Energy Transfer in the first use of the EU anti-SLAPP Directive”, accessed April 13, 2025, https://www.greenpeace.org/international/press-release/72706/greenpeace-international-files-lawsuit-against-energy-transfer-in-first-use-of-eu-anti-slapp-directive/
[2] Francesca Farrington and Magdalena Zabrocka, “Punishment by process: the development of Anti-SLAPP legislation in the European Union”, ERA FORUM (2023): 521-522. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12027-023-00774-5.
[3] Greenpeace, “Greenpeace v. Energy Transfer Partners: The Facts”, accessed April 13, 2025, https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/climate/greenpeace-v-energy-transfer-partners-facts/.
[4] Greenpeace, “US Federal Court dismisses $900 million pipeline company lawsuit against Greenpeace”, accessed April 14, 2025, https://www.greenpeace.org/international/press-release/20993/us-federal-court-dismisses-900-million-pipeline-company-lawsuit-against-greenpeace/.
[5] The Guardian, “Greenpeace must pay at least $660m over Dakota pipeline protests, jury says”, accessed April 14, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/19/greenpeace-lawsuit-energy-transfer-dakota-pipeline.
[6] Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (“Strategic lawsuits against public participation”). OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj.
[7] Article 22(1) of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[8] Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, “Chilling Effect Overview”, accessed April 14, 2025, https://www.thefire.org/research-learn/chilling-effect-overview
[9] Recital 28 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[10] Recital 8 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[11] Recital 6 and 10-12 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[12] Recital 15 and 16 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[13] Article 2 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[14] Article 6 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[15] Article 10 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[16] Recital 36 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[17] Article 11 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[18] Article 13 and Recital 37 and 40 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[19] Article 14 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[20] Article 15 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[21] Recital 42 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[22] Recital 52 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
[23] Alessandra Silveira, “Tribunais nacionais”, in Enciclopédia da União Europeia, ed. Ana Paula Brandão, Francisco Pereira Coutinho, Isabel Camisão and Joana Covelo de Abreu (Petrony, 2017), 455-458.
[24] See also Recital 43 and 44 of Directive (EU) 2024/1069.
Picture credits: by Lara Jameson on pexels.com.