I know I have Tweeted that I would add my tuppence on the Court of Appeal at The Hague on Wednesday reversing (English translation of the Court of Appeal here) the first instance judgment in Milieudefensie v Shell.
That judgment had imposed CO2 reduction emissions targets on Shell. (In my post on the first instance judgment I focus on the applicable law, Article 7 Rome II issue; that issue was not appealed).
I then however read my learned colleague and academic neighbour Quinten Jacobs’ most excellent thread on the case and, being a firm believer in progress by assimilation, I am most pleased he has accepted to turn that thread into a post, below (my contribution merely consisted of editing).
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Quick recap: In 2021, the District Court in The Hague ruled upon Milieudefensie’s claim which is based on the overall (tortious) duty of care (A6:162 Dutch Civil Code) that Shell must reduce its CO2 emissions by 45% by 2030 compared to 2019 levels. This was unprecedented. For the first time outside the context of an environmental permit, a court imposed reduction obligations on a private company. Shell argued that this ruling would force the company to halt investments and sell off assets, and it appealed the decision.
In its judgment, the Court of Appeal in The Hague first fairly succinctly summarised the scientific evidence on climate change, referencing the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, reports from the IPCC, and the IEA. The court also covered several legal instruments, such as the UN Climate Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement, and the EU’s Fit for 55 initiative. Additionally, it cited the non-binding “expression of principles” in which the Dutch government and Shell agreed on Shell’s ambition to reduce CO2 emissions by 3.9 megatons.
The ruling then examines the climate targets Shell set for itself over the years, from 1986 to 2024. Notably, Shell’s self-imposed goals frequently shift, sometimes based on emissions, and at other times based on a percentage of its spending on emission-free products.
One interesting point is admissibility. The Court of Appeal confirmed the first instance judgment that “collective claims are inadmissible insofar as they serve the interests of the global population.” However, the interests of current and future generations of Dutch citizens and residents of the Wadden area were deemed “sufficiently similar.” The court found it undesirable that only individual citizens would have to file claims separately.
Shell’s argument that the claim is a “political issue” does not, according to the Court of Appeal, prevent the claim from being admissible seeing as the claimants—several NGOs—are seeking to assert a “legal duty” allegedly violated by Shell.
On the substantive issues: According to Milieudefensie and other claimants, Shell breaches the “general duty of care,” a duty to act “in a manner befitting society,” which depends on the circumstances of each case. This is akin to what Belgium once called “a bonus pater familias”, now referred to as “a prudent and reasonable person” [in the common law known as the Man on the Clapham Omnibus] and as noted in the case at issue grounded in Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code. Specifically, Shell is accused of violating this standard by infringing on human rights.
One key question is whether protection against dangerous climate change should be regarded as a human right, specifically under the right to life (Article 2 of the ECHR) and the right to privacy (Article 8 of the ECHR). Referring to the Dutch Supreme Court’s Urgenda judgment, the very recent Swiss climate ruling by the European Court of Human Rights- Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland , and judgments in Pakistan, Colombia, Brazil, and India (Ranjitsinh and Others/Union of India and Others), as well as UN reports and resolutions, the Court of Appeal concluded [7:17] that
“there can be no doubt that protection from dangerous climate change is a human right.”
This is as such not unexpected yet important to see it confirmed by the Court of Appeal. Additionally and importantly, the court reasoned [7.17] that it is
“primarily up to legislators and governments to take measures to minimise dangerous climate change. That being said, companies, including Shell, may also have a responsibility to take measures to counter dangerous climate change.”
Shell and Milieudefensie have jumped on different sections of that sentence to declare victory.
The confirmation of Shell’s responsibility brings the court to discuss ‘indirect horizontal effect of human rights’ [7.18] ff. Human rights traditionally apply to relations between individuals and the state (so-called ‘vertical applicability’, not between private parties (‘horizontal applicability’) It is generally not possible, for example, to sue a neighbor for their alleged violation of one’s freedom of religious expression (unless a crime such as hate speech is committed). However, the court noted—correctly, in line with accepted legal principles—that human rights can also apply “horizontally,” for instance, between a citizen and a corporation. This can occur via “general private law principles,” such as the duty of care, with human rights considerations incorporated into these broad and general standards.
The court [7.24] identified several factors to determine whether a company breaches this “social standard of care” [which seems to be posited by the Court as that special form of the general duty of care: duty of care, with human rights considerations incorporated, GAVC]:
the seriousness of the threat posed, the contribution to its emergence, and the capacity to contribute to addressing it.
The court referenced several “informal and non-binding agreements” that detail companies’ responsibilities regarding climate, such as the UNGP, OECD guidelines, and ISO guidelines, which Shell has endorsed. [7:26] Even if public regulations do not explicitly compel them to do so, particularly those companies whose products contribute to the climate problem are still expected to help mitigate it.
The Court of Appeal concluded on the issue [7:27]
In summary, the court of appeal is of the opinion that companies like Shell, which contribute significantly to the climate problem and have it within their power to contribute to combating it, have an obligation to limit CO2 emissions in order to counter dangerous climate change, even if this obligation is not explicitly laid down in (public law) regulations of the countries in which the company operates. Companies like Shell thus have their own responsibility in achieving the targets of the Paris Agreement.
The next question is whether a court can impose additional reduction obligations beyond existing legislation.
In this context it is usual to recall the summary by the Court [3.5] of ‘scope emissions’, with reference to the global accounting ‘GHG Protocol’:
– scope 1: direct emissions from installations that are owned or controlled in full or in part by the company;
– scope 2: indirect emissions from third-party installations from which the company purchases electricity, steam or heat for its business activities;
– scope 3: other indirect emissions not included in scope 2 generated in the company’s value chain, including emissions generated from the use or consumption of products the company supplies to third parties, such as other organisations or consumers.
The court observed [7:28] that “a considerable amount of new climate legislation” has been enacted, some after the initial ruling. It cited the updated EU-ETS system, which already covers a significant portion of Shell’s so-called scope 1 and 2 emissions, [7:35] placing them almost entirely beyond the reach of the first instance court’s reduction order. Furthermore, a significant portion of its European scope 3 emissions will fall under the EU-ETS-2 system introduced in 2023. Due to two other directives, CSRD and CSDDD, Shell must also develop a climate transition plan aligned with the Paris Agreement.
Is this sufficient? Not entirely, according to the Court of Appeal [7:53]. These measures are “not exhaustive,” and the duty of care could still lead to a tailored reduction order, though existing legislation should be considered in assessing this duty.
The key question is whether the court imposes a reduction order on Shell. This requires a “threat of a breach of a legal duty.” Regarding scope 1 and 2 emissions, the court was brief: [7:64] no reduction order is imposed, as Shell had largely achieved the 45% reduction target compared to 2019 by the end of 2023 and committed to continue these efforts. There is no “threat of a breach” of a legal duty.
For the remaining scope 3 emissions, the court noted a consensus that emissions must be reduced by a net 45% by 2030 to keep global warming below 1.5°C. However, the court found it could not specify a particular reduction obligation for Shell Applying a general standard of -45% to Shell is [7:75] “not sufficiently case-specific” [the original Dutch text uses ‘fijnmazig’, best translated by ‘tailored’ in this case, GAVC] given evidence that reduction paths vary by sector and country, as indicated by reports from the IEA and the European Commission. The Court of Appeal [7:75] uses the simple example that
if Shell starts supplying gas to a company that previously obtained its energy from coal (which necessarily comes from a supplier other than Shell), this will lead to an increase in Shell’s scope 3 emissions, but on balance may lead to lower global CO2 emissions. It follows from that example alone that applying the general standard to Shell of a 45% reduction by the end of 2030 (or 35% or 25% in the alternative and further alternative claims) is not sufficiently case-specific.
The court acknowledged that as a major oil company, Shell has a “special responsibility,” but its product mix does not reflect the global product range, making an individual reduction order inappropriate.
[7:82] ff the Court then discusses whether a sectoral reduction target for the oil and gas portfolio is possible. Both Milieudefensie and Shell have enlisted experts who have written reports on this. According to the court, [7:91] “no sufficiently unequivocal conclusion can be drawn from all these sources regarding the required reduction in emissions from the combustion of oil and gas on which to base an order by the civil courts against a specific company.”
The contested assumptions, including the percentages from the IEA, call for “great caution in elevating numbers based on these reports to a legal norm.” It also plays a role that Milieudefensie itself contradicts or qualifies those numbers. According to the court [7:96] the available data do not provide “sufficient support” to oblige Shell to reduce its CO2 emissions by a certain percentage in 2030. Therefore, Milieudefensie’s claims are dismissed.
Obiter, the court went on to consider [7.97] ff whether scope 3 reduction obligations would be ‘effective’. Shell argued that if it complied with the reduction order by ceasing sales of fossil fuels from other producers, those companies would simply continue supplying fossil fuels to other buyers, with another company taking over Shell’s trading activities.
Both parties submitted reports from climate scientists on this reasoning. The court concluded that it had not been demonstrated that a reduction obligation imposed on a single company would positively impact the fight against climate change. There was no proven causal link between restricting sales and a reduction in emissions. The court found the “signaling function” of such an order “too speculative.” Core is [7:106]:
The district court rejected Shell’s contention that an obligation to reduce its scope 3 emissions by a certain percentage is not effective on the basis that any reduction in greenhouse gas emissions has a positive effect on combating climate change (paragraph 4.4.49 of the district court’s judgment). This consideration is correct in itself and is also in line with what the Supreme Court considered in the Urgenda judgment (legal ground 5.7.7 and 5.7.8). However, this does not mean that a reduction obligation imposed on a specific company will have such a positive effect, especially if this reduction obligation can also be realised by selling less fossil fuels. After all, in that scenario, the specific company would only disappear from the value chain and the (already produced) fossil fuels would still reach the end consumer via another intermediary. There may be a causal relationship between a production limitation and emission reduction, as assumed by the district court (cf. section 4.4.50 of the district court’s judgment), but Milieudefensie et al. have failed to put forward sufficient grounds to assume that in this case a causal relationship (also) exists between a sales limitation and emission reduction.
This is what Geert referred to as the ‘drug dealer defence’. [And note the obiter and cautious opening which the Court leaves for production obligations, GAVC].
This appears to be a significant barrier for future climate litigation. If only one party is brought before the court, Shell’s argument—that other companies will simply take over its role—could always come into play.
The court’s conclusion: Shell has a responsibility in the climate transition, but this does not translate into a specific reduction order. A single reduction target of 45% for one company is too general, and it has not been demonstrated that such an order would effectively lower (global) emissions. Or, in the Court’s words [7:111]:
While it follows from the foregoing that Shell may have obligations to reduce its scope 3 emissions, this cannot lead to the award of Milieudefensie et al.’s claims on this point. The court of appeal has come to the conclusion that Shell cannot be bound by a 45% reduction standard (or any other percentage) agreed by climate science because this percentage does not apply to every country and every business sector individually. The court has answered in the negative the question whether a sectoral standard for oil and gas can be established on the basis of scientific consensus. This entails that based on the available climate science, it cannot be said that a 45% reduction obligation (or any other percentage) applies to Shell in respect of scope 3. In addition, it could not be established that an obligation on Shell to reduce its scope 3 emissions by a certain percentage is effective, so that, at any rate, Milieudefensie et al. have no interest in their scope 3 claim.
Quinten.
