Donald Trump claims that taking control of Greenland is vital for US national security. Ulrik Pram Gad argues that misreading dynamics in the Arctic risks an escalation that no one wants and that will leave us all less secure.
President Donald J. Trump insists on buying or taking Greenland “for purposes of national security and freedom throughout the world”. Most recently, he cited one reason that “you don’t even need binoculars – you look outside. You have China ships all over the place. You have Russian ships all over the place.” This is a misunderstanding that conflates what goes on in different parts of the Arctic, and it is dangerous for all of us if the US acts on it.
In order not to jeopardise US national security and peace across the Arctic, it is important to understand that in terms of military security, the Arctic is not one theatre. Everything is surely related to everything, but Greenland is only relevant to some of the stuff going on in the maritime, submarine and aerial domains. Moreover, it is important to understand how war and military operations may and may not be conducted in an Arctic territory like Greenland because misguided militarisation of Greenland will harm rather than help US national security and regional peace.
No cities connected by road
Canadian officers are fond of explaining how any foreign invasion of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago neighbouring Greenland would instantly turn into a search and rescue operation. Once ashore, invaders would not be able to go anywhere. No two Greenlandic settlements are connected by roads. The coastline is cut through with deep fjords, glaciers and sharp mountain ranges. Going inland will demand a weeks-long crossing of the inland ice. Greenlanders, knowing their geography, fear no invasion. However, they do worry that civilian critical infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage – particularly telecommunications that depend on only two submarine cables.
The US already controls the territory in terms of military security, as formalised in a 1951 agreement with Denmark co-signed by the autonomous Government of Greenland in 2004. There are no Chinese investments or infrastructure in Greenland. It is very difficult to conceive of any military installation or activity which the Danish or Greenlandic authorities would be able to deny the US. Let alone any they would want to deny, if the US explained its necessity.
However, to avoid military investments that are both immensely expensive under Arctic conditions and might escalate tensions in the Arctic without contributing positively to US security, it is important to know what role Greenland plays in Arctic security. There are five distinct theatres in the Arctic; they are related but very different configurations of vessels operate in them.
Chinese activity is very far from Greenland
First, climate change makes the coast of Siberia more accessible. That has prompted Russia to revamp Cold War bases to defend their onshore natural resources against possible adversaries. Russia is also developing the Northern Sea Road along the coast. As Western sanctions have kicked in, Russia depends on China to do this. Most activity concerns Liquefied Natural Gas from the Yamal peninsula in the East. So there are indeed Russian and Chinese ships in the Arctic, but these vessels are too far away to see from Greenland with or without binoculars.
Second, in the Far East, the Chinese navy has occasionally joined Russian coast guard manoeuvres in the Bering Strait near Alaska. Greenland is hardly relevant for that. Third, in the European Arctic, Russia’s nuclear strategy depends on defending the Kola Peninsula where most of the missiles meant for the US are placed. In the event of a conflict, this involves pushing back NATO forces across Northern Scandinavia and the Barents Sea. This is why Norway has recently invited the US and UK navies back, and each of the Scandinavian countries recently concluded agreements with the US to allow more flexible movement and stationing of troops.
Fourth, Russian second-strike capability in the event of a nuclear conflict relies on submarines having come out of Murmansk, hiding under the polar ice, and sneaking through the “GIUK” gap between Greenland, Iceland and the UK. So there might indeed be Russian vessels in the vicinity of Greenland. The US, the UK and Norway are “phishing” for these submarines. Denmark is likely going to chip in as a result of the defence spending negotiations currently being concluded in the Danish parliament.
Fifth, Greenland’s most crucial role in the defence of the North American continent is to facilitate radars and other means of domain awareness in order to know what flies in from Eurasia. The US Space Command operates radars at Pituffik, formerly known as Thule Air Base, that look for incoming missiles and monitors space-based threats.
As Russia reopens bases along the Siberian coast, the US might want to defend those radars by, for instance, preparing the base for F35 jets. This is facilitated by the 1951 agreement, which will also facilitate new radars on the East coast of Greenland and on drones and vessels operating along the coast. Denmark has allocated some funds to this purpose and more will likely follow as the current round of negotiations in the Danish parliament conclude.
While increased domain awareness is both legitimate and necessary, neither the US nor Danish and Greenlandic authorities have so far found anything that warrants further military buildup in Greenland. This appears highly fortunate, keeping in mind the legitimate US worries over possible offensive use of Russia’s new defensive installations along the coast of Siberia. A misreading of dynamics across the distinct Arctic theatres risks setting in motion a spiral of escalation that no one wants, and that will leave us all less secure.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: muratart / Shutterstock.com
