João Pedro Sousa (master’s student in European Union Law at the School of Law of the University of Minho)
1. Preliminary considerations
Judicial independence is a fundamental pillar of the rule of law enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It guarantees that judges are free from external pressures – whether from the executive, legislative branches, or private interests –, allowing them to adjudicate cases impartially and fairly. In the European Union (EU) context, judicial independence transcends the internal affairs of Member States; it is an essential safeguard to ensure the full application of EU law and effective judicial protection. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has consistently emphasised that national courts act as “European courts”,[1] applying and upholding EU law within their jurisdictions. Consequently, any impairment to the judicial independence in a Member State poses a national constitutional issue and a direct threat to the European legal order.[2]
The recent joined cases C-146/23 (Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku) and C-374/23[3] (Adoreikė) come at a pivotal moment as concerns over the rule of law rise in certain Member States. These joined cases addressed whether budgetary measures impacting the remuneration of judges in Poland and Lithuania, introduced through national legislation, violated EU law by undermining judicial independence. Their significance is heightened by the fact that they coincide with the seventh anniversary of the “Portuguese Judges” judgment [Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas (ASJP)],[4] a landmark case that firmly established judicial independence as a fundamental element of the rule of law under EU law. As highlighted in a recent analysis on this blog, understanding the legacy of the “Portuguese Judges” judgment is essential to contextualising the challenges facing the judiciary today.[5]
In line with the evolution of its case law, the CJEU’s judgment in the joined cases C-146/23 and C-374/23 reaffirmed that while Member States retain discretion over the organisation of their judicial systems, this is bounded by the Union’s fundamental values including effective judicial protection under Article 19(1) second subparagraph TEU, because the Member States are required to comply with their obligations deriving from EU law. To that extent the “Portuguese Judges” judgment demonstrated that budgetary constraints may justify certain adjustments to the remuneration of judges if they are temporary, proportionate, and part of public-sector expenditure measures.[6] However, the key issue in C-146/23 and C-374/23 is whether such measures, despite being temporary and linked to socio-economic context, can be regarded as neutral public-sector policies or if they expose a more subtle form of political interference masked as fiscal restraint.
This text will critically examine the legal consequences of the joined cases C-146/23 and C-374/23, explore how they build upon the “Portuguese Judges” case, and further define the boundaries between legitimate national discretion and unlawful interference on judicial independence. Ultimately, it will address a central issue: to what extent can budgetary restriction measures affecting judges’ remuneration be justified without crossing the line into violations of the rule of law under EU law?
2. Legal and factual context
The joined cases C-146/23 and C-374/23 arose from legal challenges brought by judges in Poland and Lithuania concerning the remuneration of judges. The central issue in both cases revolves around the interpretation of Article 2 and Article 19(1) TEU, as well as Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) – on the right to an effective judicial remedy, which must be duly taken into consideration for the purposes of interpreting the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (paras. 1 and 43) – in the context of national measures affecting judges’ remuneration and judicial independence.
In C-146/23, the dispute concerned the Polish judge XL, who contested the method used to calculate his remuneration. Under Article 91(1c) of the Polish Law on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, judges’ remuneration was traditionally tied to the average salary for the second quarter of the preceding year. However, this mechanism was amended three times: for 2021, the calculation referred to 2019 salaries (instead of 2020); for 2022, the 2020 figure was used, with a minimal increase of 26 Polish zlotys (approximately EUR 6); and in 2023, the remuneration was dissociated from the statistical calculation, relying instead on a basic amount set by the Polish legislature. The Polish Government justified these derogations by invoking the economic situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the resulting rise in energy prices (paras. 10-21). The referring Polish court expressed concerns that the sustained freezing of judges’ salaries for three years and the abandonment in 2023 of the mechanism for determining their remuneration based on the average salary of the second quarter of the preceding year undermine the right of judges to receive remuneration determined by objective criteria, independent of arbitrary decisions by the legislature, and consistent with the dignity of their office. It also noted that while the freezing of salaries was initially intended to be temporary, its extension for 2023 demonstrates the intention to permanently reduce judges’ remuneration. Furthermore, the referring Polish court argued that any intervention in the functioning and organisation of the judiciary should only occur exceptionally and result from concerted action by both the legislature and the judiciary to avoid arbitrary interference by the executive and legislature, which undermines judicial independence (paras. 17-19).
In C-374/23, Lithuanian judges SR and RB similarly challenged the discretion afforded to the legislature and executive in determining their remuneration. Their salaries, calculated under the Law on the Remuneration of Judges (2008), were based on a base rate set annually by the Lithuanian Parliament on the Government’s proposal. This rate could not be lower than the previous year’s but was adjusted according to economic factors such as inflation rates, the minimum monthly salary, and the impact of other factors affecting the level and evolution of the average salary in the public sector (para. 7). The Republic of Lithuania contends that planning of the State budget and, in particular, of the rate of remuneration of public officials falls within the constitutional prerogatives of the Government. In addition, the base rate of remuneration is set annually according to the resources and financial constraints of the State, meaning it could not be increased more rapidly (para. 24). The referring court states that the remuneration of the judges of the Regional Courts is calculated by multiplying the base rate, which was EUR 181 in 2022 and EUR 186 in 2023, by a salary coefficient that has remained unchanged since 1 October 2013, except for the judges of the District Courts (para. 25). The judges argued that this system lacked stable and independent criteria, asserting that the determination of their remuneration was subject to the political will of the executive and the legislature, thereby failing to observe, inter alia, the constitutional principle of judicial independence (paras. 22–23). The referring Lithuanian court questioned whether a national system for the remuneration of judges, which is directly dependent on the political will of the legislature and the executive, is consistent with EU law, particularly with the values protected by Article 2 TEU and Article 47 CFREU, thus raising concerns about its compatibility with the guarantee judicial independence and the right to an effective remedy (paras. 29–30).
These cases were built directly on the foundation laid in the “Portuguese Judges” judgment. In that case, the CJEU accepted temporary and proportionate remuneration reductions for Portuguese judges as part of broader austerity measures affecting the entire public sector during the financial crisis. The question in the joined cases C-146/23 and C-374/23 was whether the Polish and Lithuanian measures could be similarly justified or if they crossed the line into impermissible interference with judicial independence (paras. 65-76).
3. Findings of the Court
The CJEU, sitting as the Grand Chamber, reaffirmed the fundamental principle that judicial independence is essential to ensuring the full application of EU law and the judicial protection that individuals derive from EU law (para. 47). The Court’s judgment rested on a meticulous interpretation of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the CFREU, reinforcing the idea that national courts are also European courts tasked with ensuring the full application of EU law (paras. 46–48). The Court drew a clear distinction between legitimate national discretion in organising judicial systems, including setting judges’ remuneration, and actions that violate EU law by compromising judicial independence.
The CJEU emphasised that while Member States retain the authority to organise their judicial systems, this discretion is not absolute. It must operate within the boundaries set by EU law, particularly the obligation to safeguard judicial independence. The Court emphasised that judicial independence is not merely a formal concept but a substantive guarantee that requires judges to be free from external pressures, whether direct or indirect. This freedom includes the receipt of a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of judicial functions, as it constitutes a safeguard against undue influence and a key element in ensuring impartiality, as previously stated in the “Portuguese judges” judgment (para. 49).
The CJEU reaffirmed that any mechanism for determining judges’ remuneration must be objective, foreseeable, stable, and transparent (para. 56). It also addressed the circumstances under which Member States may adopt budgetary restriction measures affecting judges’ remuneration. While acknowledging that Member States may, in exceptional cases, impose such measures, the Court set strict conditions for their legitimacy (paras. 65-76). These measures must pursue an objective of general interest, such as eliminating an excessive government deficit, as recognised in the “Portuguese Judges” judgment. However, the Court was careful to highlight that these measures must not specifically target the judiciary; rather, they should form part of broader reforms affecting the public sector as a whole. Additionally, any budgetary restriction must be temporary and proportionate to the aim pursued, ensuring that judges’ financial security is not unduly compromised (paras. 67, 69, 73).
In assessing the Polish and Lithuanian measures at the heart of the joined cases, the Court scrutinised their compatibility with EU law, particularly the principle of judicial independence:
i) Regarding Poland, the Court acknowledged the Polish Government’s justification for the remuneration measures applicable in 2022 and 2023, which derogated from Article 91(1c) of the Law on the Organisation of the Ordinary Courts. These derogations were presented as responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, and the resulting increase in energy prices (para. 78). The Court observed that the contested measures, set out on Article 8 of the Law accompanying the budget for 2022 and Article 8 of the Law accompanying the budget for 2023, specifically targeted the remuneration of judges and prosecutors, which prima facie, could undermine the principle of judicial independence (para. 79). However, having regard to the considerations set out in paragraphs 69 and 70 and the Polish Government evidence, the Court did not automatically conclude that these measures breached EU law. Instead, it instructed the referring court to ascertain whether these measures, while specifically aimed at judges, formed part of broader budgetary restrictions that also affected other categories of officials or public servants. According to the Polish Government evidence, these measures could seek to apply, on a deferred basis, to judges budgetary restrictions that had already been imposed on other public sector workers in previous years (para. 79). Furthermore, the Court noted that, subject to verification by the referring court, the contested remuneration measures each applied for only one year. It observed that these measures appeared to be exceptional and temporary, as indicated by the fact that the mechanism for calculating remuneration was not repealed and was reinstated in 2024, as confirmed by the Polish Government and the Commission during the hearing before the Court (para. 80). Again subject to verification by the referring court, it is also apparent that the remunerations freezes did not seem to reduce judges’ remuneration in absolute terms; although there was a loss of purchasing power, the remunerations were frozen in 2021 but increased by 4.37% in 2022 and 7.8% in 2023. When bonuses and exemptions from social security contributions, amounting to nearly 14% of gross remuneration, were factored in, Polish judges’ remuneration reportedly remained three times the national average salary, as stated by the Polish Government and the Commission (para. 81). Another critical point was the Court’s acknowledgement of the availability of effective judicial review in Poland. The very fact that the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku (District Court, Białystok) referred the case for a preliminary ruling demonstrated that judges had access to a judicial remedy to contest the salary measures (para. 82). Accordingly, subject to verification by the referring court, there is no indication that Article 8 of the Law accompanying the budget for 2022 and Article 8 of the Law accompanying the budget for 2023, violated the requirements of judicial independence under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU (para. 83).
ii) Turning to Lithuania, the Court examined the system governing judges’ remuneration, which is based on a base rate set annually by the legislature and the executive. This rate is adjusted according to a set of objective criteria, including the annual inflation rate for the preceding year, which depends on the national consumer price index, the level of the minimum monthly salary, and the impact of other factors affecting the level and evolution of the average salary in the public sector (para. 84). The Court acknowledged that, subject to verification by the referring court, these rules appeared to be objective, foreseeable, stable, and transparent, essential safeguards for judicial independence (para. 84). Addressing concerns about the adequacy of judges’ remuneration in Lithuania, the Court reiterated that the assessment must consider the economic, social, and financial situation of the MS and compare judges’ remuneration with the national average salary (para. 85).[7] The Court cited the 2022 report by the European Commission for the efficiency of justice (CEPEJ), which showed that in 2020, Lithuanian judges’ average gross salary at the beginning of their career was 2.1 times the national average, rising to 2.9 times for judges of the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Supreme Court of Lithuania) (para. 86). The Court noted that while a 2019 tax reform had resulted in a nominal reduction of judges’ remuneration, there was insufficient detail in the referring court’s order to establish whether this undermined judicial independence (para. 87). Consequently, pending verification by the referring court, there is no indication that the remuneration rules applicable to SR and RB during the relevant period violated the principle of judicial independence (para. 88). Finally, the reference for a preliminary ruling from the Regional Administrative Court of Vilnius is sufficient to demonstrate the possibility of effective judicial review of the contested salary measures (para. 89).
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the principle of judicial independence does not preclude national measures to set or adjust judges’ remuneration, provided such measures meet specific criteria. These measures must be lawful, transparent, and non-arbitrary, with detailed rules that are objective, foreseeable, stable, and proportionate to a legitimate general interest. The Court further clarified that even derogations from national legislation that freeze or reduce the remuneration of judges can comply with EU law, so long as they are based on law, pursue an objective of general interest, and form part of broader public sector reforms rather than targeting judges specifically. Crucially, such measures must be exceptional, temporary, and open to effective judicial review (para. 90).
In conclusion, the CJEU did not find an automatic violation of judicial independence in either the Polish or Lithuanian case. Instead, it left the final determination to the referring courts, instructing them to verify whether the remuneration measures were exceptional, proportionate, and part of wider public sector reforms and whether judges had access to effective judicial remedies. The Court’s careful balancing of national discretion and EU oversight highlights its nuanced approach to protecting judicial independence, ensuring that Member States retain some flexibility in managing budgetary constraints, but never at the expense of the fundamental values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
Concluding observations
Returning to the question raised in the introduction – to what extent can budgetary restriction measures affecting judges’ remuneration be justified without crossing the line into violations of the rule of law under EU law? – the joined cases C-146/23 and C-374/23 provided a clear but carefully balanced framework. The Court reaffirmed that while budgetary constraints may justify temporary and proportionate adjustments to judges’ remuneration, such measures must adhere to strict legal and procedural safeguards. Critically, any interference must be exceptional, transparent, and part of broader public-sector reforms, ensuring that judges remain free from financial or political pressures.
This judgment accentuates that judicial independence is a fundamental European value deeply rooted in Article 2 and Article 19(1) TEU. Neither Article 2 TEU nor the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, nor any other provision of EU law requires Member States to adopt a particular constitutional model governing the relationships and interaction between the various branches of the State, in particular as regards the definition and delimitation of their competences. Under Article 4(2) TEU, the EU must respect the national identities of the Member States, inherent in their fundamental political and constitutional structures. However, in choosing their respective constitutional model, the Member States are required to comply with their obligations deriving from EU law (paras. 45-46).
The Court’s firm position makes clear budgetary justifications do not grant unchecked power to alter judges’ remuneration in ways that could compromise judicial independence. Any direct or indirect attempt to exert control over the judiciary will be subject to rigorous scrutiny under EU law. This perspective aligns with the analysis presented by Alessandra Silveira, who has consistently emphasised that a problem related to judicial independence in a Member State is necessarily a European problem, since national courts and the CJEU share responsibility for ensuring the full application of EU law and protecting the fundamental rights of individuals across the Member States. [8]/[9]/[10]
By strengthening the link between judicial independence and the full application of EU law, the CJEU has further consolidated the legal framework protecting the rule of law. Judges’ remuneration cannot be manipulated as a tool of influence, as doing so risks violating the rule of law, weakening national judicial independence, and jeopardising the EU’s constitutional structure. In conclusion, joined cases C-146/23 and C-374/23 reaffirm the CJEU’s ongoing role as a guardian of the rule of law, solidifying judicial independence as a shared European value, essential to preserving democracy, protecting fundamental rights, and ensuring the full application of EU law.
[1] This perspective was thoroughly developed by Alessandra Silveira in “Tribunais nacionais” in Enciclopédia da União Europeia, ed. Ana Paula Brandão, Francisco Pereira Coutinho, Isabel Camisão, Joana Covelo de Abreu (Braga: Petrony, July 2017), 455-458.
[2] Alessandra Silveira, Joana Abreu, Pedro Froufe, and Sophie Perez, “União de direito para além do direito da União – as garantias de independência judicial no acórdão Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,” Julgar, May 2018. Available at http://julgar.pt/uniao-de-direito-para-alem-do-direito-da-uniao-as-garantias-de-independencia-judicial-no-acordao-associacao-sindical-dos-juizes-portugueses/.
[3] Judgment CJEU XL and Others v. Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Lietuvos Respublika, 25 February 2025, case C-146/23, ECLI:EU:C:2025:109.
[4] Judgment CJEU Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, 27 February 2018, case C-64/16 ECLI:EU:C:2018:117.
[5] See Juan Gálvez Galisteo, “7 years of the Portuguese Judges judgment – understanding where we come from so we know where we are going”, The Official Blog of UNIO – Thinking and Debating Europe, 15 March 2025, https://officialblogofunio.com/2025/03/15/7-years-of-the-portuguese-judges-judgment-understanding-where-we-come-from-so-we-know-where-we-are-going/.
[6] Judgment Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, para. 46.
[7] In line with Advocate General’s Opinion of 13 June 2024, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku, C-146/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:507, 49.
[8] See Alessandra Silveira, “Horizontal integration and Union based on the rule of law” in Estado de Direito na União Europeia, ed. Anabela Miranda Rodrigues, Jónatas Machado, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Coimbra: Instituto Jurídico da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra, 2022), 1-12. https://ucpages.uc.pt/site/assets/files/873179/ruleoflaw_cap1.pdf.
[9] Alessandra Silveira and Sophie Perez Fernandes, “A Union Based on the Rule of Law Beyond the Scope of EU Law – The Guarantees Essential to Judicial Independence in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,” The Official Blog of UNIO – Thinking and Debating Europe, 3 April 2018, https://officialblogofunio.com/2018/04/03/a-union-based-on-the-rule-of-law-beyond-the-scope-of-eu-law-the-guarantees-essential-to-judicial-independence-in-associacao-sindical-dos-juizes-portugueses/.
[10] Alessandra Silveira and Joana Abreu, “Review of Portuguese Association of European Law’s webinar on the rule of law protection in the European Union”, The Official Blog of UNIO – Thinking and Debating Europe, 14 June 2021, https://officialblogofunio.com/2021/06/14/review-of-portuguese-association-of-european-laws-webinar-on-the-rule-of-law-protection-in-the-european-union.
Picture credit: by KATRIN BOLOVTSOVA on pexels.com.
