Why are “culture wars” prominent in some European countries but not in others? In new research, Tadeas Cely finds roots for these divides in historic divergence embedded in religious cultures.
The term “culture wars” (Kulturkampf) was famously first used by Otto von Bismarck to describe a struggle for influence with the Catholic Church (1871-1878). At that time, issues such as education, civil marriage and, to a lesser extent, topics like cremation were at the forefront.
Today, we still hear about culture wars, with topics ranging from LGBTQ+ rights in Madrid to debates over strict abortion policies in Poland. Such issues are sometimes championed by politicians, like Éric Zemmour in France, dividing public opinion and fuelling intense conflict. However, these conflicts appear in some contexts more than others. This raises an important question: in which countries is public opinion divided on morality issues, rather than on questions related to self-interest (such as economic issues)?
Public opinion polarisation
In a new study, I seek to answer this question by looking at public opinion polarisation. When I refer to public opinion polarisation, I mean the extent to which disagreements on issues within a particular domain can be condensed into a single ideological dimension of conflict. Additionally, I also look at associations between opinions and ideological identities.
It’s important to distinguish this from polarisation on individual morality issues, as this approach is more robust and less sensitive to frequent shifts in political agendas. Polarisation measures are calculated as the average correlation between two similar opinion vectors (such as opinions on two morality issues) within a specific context. In this analysis, I use a simplified approach by subtracting polarisation on economic issues from that on morality issues to highlight differences in disagreement.
Which publics are divided on what?
Using European Values Study surveys, I focus on how disagreements differ across European countries (1990-2017). We might expect to find differences between less developed and more developed countries, given the so called “post-materialism thesis” that states that as societies reach higher levels of economic prosperity, they are more likely to shift their priorities away from material needs.
We also might expect to find differences related to religion. In some European countries, there has historically been a church-state cleavage centring on clashes over secularisation, which were particularly pronounced in predominantly Catholic countries and virtually absent in predominantly Protestant ones. These conflicts persist in beliefs and perceptions that also affect non-religious people. My findings suggest these deep imprints from religious cultures do indeed persist today across Europe.
Overall, my analysis produced three clear findings. First, public opinion on morality issues is more aligned within Catholic countries than in Protestant countries, with issue alignment being 40% higher and ideological identity alignment 90% higher in Catholic countries.
Second, on economic issues, the pattern is reversed. Within Catholic countries, issue alignment is 50% lower and ideological identity alignment is 70% lower than in Protestant countries. Third, there is a disappearing East-West divide. Although more developed countries were somewhat more aligned on morality issues than less developed countries in 1990, these same countries were slightly less aligned on these issues in 2017.
The importance of religious cultures
The pattern I find cannot be explained by differences in development. Instead, it aligns with the divergence between Catholic and Protestant religious traditions. For instance, consider the contrast between Catholic Poland or Austria and predominantly agnostic Czechia or Germany, which have mixed religious traditions.
Overall, Catholic countries in Eastern, Southern, and (to a lesser extent) Western Europe are at the forefront of the morality-based opinion divide. In contrast, public opinion on these issues in Nordic countries is more fragmented, with economic issues instead appearing to cluster opinions more strongly. To visualise this pattern, I have plotted aggregated results over time in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Polarisation on morality-economic issues in Europe (1990-2017)
Note: The map shows the extent to which a society is more polarised on morality rather than economic issues. A higher number indicates more polarisation on morality issues. For more information see the author’s accompanying paper in European Union Politics.
Second, I address the concern that secularisation and the rise of religiously unaffiliated respondents might be weakening these differences over time. Here, I focus solely on public opinion polarisation regarding morality issues, with the measure ranging from 0 to 1. Figure 2 is based on multi-level models with varying intercepts (countries) and slopes (time). In the main paper, I provide a much more detailed account of this argument, describing polarisation within individual countries and its change over time.
Figure 2: Polarisation across contexts and birth cohorts
Note: For more information see the author’s accompanying paper in European Union Politics.
My findings show there are substantial differences in the issues over which we are divided. Some may ask, however, why we do not see significant conflict over these issues in all Catholic countries. The answer is that public disagreement over morality issues is a necessary but insufficient condition for “culture wars” to take place: although the public may be divided, there might be limited attention paid to these issues.
Culture war narratives may emerge where mass opinion is not deeply polarised, yet certain subpopulations feel strongly (as in Hungary). Conversely, it may be absent in some Catholic countries of Western Europe, where, despite social divides on cultural matters, political leaders do not exploit these issues. Nonetheless, as I show here, societies with Catholic religious traditions have a context particularly ripe for such exploitation.
For more information, see the author’s accompanying paper in European Union Politics.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: BreizhAtao / Shutterstock.com