As the EU pursues a new relationship with Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, it would be wise to remember the mistakes made in Afghanistan, argues Loqman Radpey.
Europe’s engagement with the recently established regime in Syria has been notably swift. In early January 2025, the German and French foreign ministers, Annalena Baerbock and Jean-Noël Barrot, visited Damascus to meet the interim rulers there, less than a month after Bashar al-Assad’s fall on 8 December 2024.
This approach has been substantially different from that taken following the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, highlighting the complexity of modern diplomacy and the intricate geopolitical and ideological factors driving Europe’s foreign policy decisions in the Middle East.
Syria’s de facto rulers
The Taliban’s return unfolded amid the chaotic withdrawal of US forces, a debacle that underscored strategic missteps by the West. Despite initial promises of moderation, the Taliban quickly reversed course, severely restricting women’s rights and education. This repressive turn solidified their pariah status in the eyes of western democracies, where gender equality and inclusivity are integral to public and political life.
In stark contrast, the new Syrian governing authority has meticulously cultivated an image of pragmatism and reform. By disavowing extremist ties, embracing inclusive rhetoric and committing to preserving women’s education, they have sought to distance themselves from the failures and radicalism associated with Assad’s regime and from competing Islamist movements. Such moves resonate strongly in Europe, where public opinion is shaped by democratic values and scepticism of religious fundamentalism.
Notably, the transitional ruling in Damascus consists of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA), both backed by Turkey. HTS, a rebranded faction with roots in Al-Qaeda and ISIS, has been framed as a pragmatic option in the absence of viable alternatives. However, extremist alliances rarely lead to democratic outcomes, raising questions about the long-term stability and governance of Syria under their rule. HTS is still designated as a terrorist group by the European Union, the UK, the UN and other influential states.
The emerging Syrian leadership has demonstrated an understanding of public relations, strategically positioning itself as a partner for stability. In contrast to the Taliban’s austere and isolationist image, the Syrian authorities have embraced media accessibility and modern optics.
The de facto leader, Mohammad al-Shaara – better known as the jihadist Abu Mohammed al-Julani, on whom an anti-terrorist bounty has now been removed by the US – physically groomed himself for the role, making himself a photogenic and accessible character for journalists. The new regime’s polished appearance and promises of inclusivity – particularly regarding women’s roles in society – offer a stark contrast to the Taliban’s regressive policies. In a region where public perception often dictates policy decisions, this tactic has paid dividends.
Geopolitics and human rights
The geopolitical landscape further underscores Europe’s approach. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 reinforced its adversarial status in the West, and Assad’s regime – a long-time Russian ally – became an extension of Moscow’s influence in the Middle East. With Assad’s ousting, Europe sees an opportunity to weaken Russia’s foothold in the region. Similarly, Iran’s diminished influence in post-Assad Syria aligns with European and American strategic goals of countering Tehran’s regional ambitions. By engaging with Syria’s emerging power holders, Europe is signalling a shift toward alliances that curb authoritarian and anti-western forces.
Syria’s Christian minority and the transitional regime’s overtures toward religious and ethnic coexistence provide additional appeal for European policymakers. The Taliban’s Sunni-dominated governance, alongside its repression of Afghanistan’s women, their right to education and the mistreatment of minorities, especially Hazaras, highlights its incompatibility with western ideals of pluralism.
Europe’s historical commitment to pluralism and human rights sets a clear standard that conflicts with the Taliban’s approach, which is characterised by its authoritarian rule and systematic denial of basic freedoms. By imposing rigid interpretations of Islam, the Taliban not only restricts women’s rights but also stifles the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, further exacerbating tensions with international expectations of governance that respect pluralistic values.
By contrast, Syria’s interim leadership has positioned itself as a guardian of diversity, emphasising tolerance in a region often defined by sectarian strife. However, there are reports of minorities like Christians and Alawites being suppressed by factions of HTS and the SNA. Their houses have also been looted.
The Kurds
A critical, albeit understated factor in Europe’s approach in Syria is the Kurds. The Kurds were victims of the previous Syrian regime’s policies of Arabisation and suppression. Since 2012, the Kurdish-led administration, known as Rojava Kurdistan, has established a model of pluralistic democracy, offering refuge to diverse ethnic and religious groups.
The Kurds’ contributions to the fight against ISIS, marked by over 12,000 fatalities and 15,000 injuries, have earned them recognition as reliable allies of the West. They formed the People’s Defence Units (YPG) and Women’s Defence Units (YPJ), which were both supported by the US in their fight against ISIS. These units later evolved into the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which has effective control over one-third of Syria.
However, the SNA has been actively involved in fighting against Kurdish forces since December 2024, including in heavy clashes supported by Turkey at the Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates. Despite this, European diplomats have emphasised their commitment to safeguarding the autonomy of Kurdish partners, framing this as a bulwark against extremism and a model for governance in the region.
With their democratic credentials, they do not require any assessment or testing, as opposed to the new regime in Damascus. Europe’s experience with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq offers a valuable example of successful collaboration, showcasing the potential for productive partnerships with Kurdish actors. This relationship has demonstrated that Kurdish-led governance, when supported by the international community, can align with democratic principles and human rights standards, even in the face of regional instability.
Avoiding the mistakes of the past
Since 2014, Europe has hosted millions of Syrian refugees, many of whom fled the violence and extremism that flourished during the civil war. With continuing pressures on European governments – ranging from housing and social integration to economic strain – the prospect of these refugees returning to a stable Syria presents a compelling incentive for Europe to engage with Damascus and support its transition.
Europe’s engagement with Damascus is further driven by pragmatic concerns over the growing threat of Islamism. Curbing the spread of radical Islamism has become an increasingly urgent concern for Europe. A Syria that embraces moderate political reforms, inclusive governance and a clear commitment to combatting terrorism offers an opportunity to reduce the risk of Islamist movements gaining further traction within Syria or spilling over into neighbouring countries.
Europe’s stance toward Syria’s de facto authorities reflects a calculated effort to balance moral imperatives with geopolitical realities. In contrast to its stance on the Taliban, Europe is extending an olive branch to Damascus, signalling that recognition is attainable. Europeans strive to build stability that aligns with European interests and chart a path leading to a more inclusive Middle East.
This nuanced strategy underscores the interplay between values, geopolitics and the imperatives of realpolitik in shaping foreign policy. Europe aims to guide the transitional government in Damascus in their pursuit of recognition by promoting “a peaceful and urgent transition in the service of Syrians and for regional stability”, as Jean-Noël Barrot stated. Yet as Annalena Baerbock warned in the same meeting, Europe “will not fund new Islamist structures”.
This approach is being complemented with concrete measures, including providing expertise in criminology to support accountability for crimes committed during the Assad regime. By extending cautious support to Damascus, Europe hopes, “without naivety”, to avoid the mistakes made in handling the return of the Taliban, where isolation and distrust contributed to entrenched instability.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: © European Union
