Does downward class mobility increase the likelihood of voting for far-right parties? If so, why, and through which mechanisms? How important is the group of downwardly mobile individuals for driving far-right party success? Alexi Gugushvili, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas argue that downward class mobility significantly affects far-right voting but only under specific conditions.
Class features prominently in studies on voting behaviour. While the relationship between class and far-right voting is a much-debated topic, recent scholarship shows how perceived class decline might augment the far-right. We know less, however, about the objective mechanisms of class decline – or in other words, the ways in which actual intergenerational class mobility, specifically in the downward direction, may explain why certain individuals opt for far-right parties.
We address this question in a new study which theorises and empirically tests the effects of actual class mobility on far-right party support. In sum, our findings show that downward class mobility matters most when the fall is dramatic from the highest to the lowest classes. This relationship is predominantly driven by material and existential issues. Finally, context matters significantly, as downward class mobility has the strongest effect on far-right voting in societies where levels of class decline are overall low.
Intergenerational class mobility and far-right party support
Class decline is important for our understanding of how people behave politically, with significant consequences for political instability, participation and voting behaviour. Unlike their stable class counterparts, mobile individuals are not only attached to two different social environments, their origins and destination classes, but also experience a change in position from one class to another.
Thus, the experience of downward mobility itself may have effects on far-right voting behaviour, independently of an individual’s class origin, which may shape which attitudes they have assimilated, or their class destination which determines the social environments in which they are socialised.
Mechanisms
The experience of class decline may affect far-right voting behaviour via four main mechanisms: discontent, loss, internal blame attribution and external blame attribution (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: The four reasons why downward class mobility leads to far-right voting
Note: For more information, see the authors’ accompanying paper in Political Behavior.
Life dissatisfaction (discontent) may occur if individuals who fall from a higher to a lower class feel that their life has not lived up to expectations, leading to reduced wellbeing and a sense of failure. Downward mobility can also create economic insecurity (loss) via a decline in material wealth, resulting in anxiety about one’s economic future.
Those experiencing social descent may hold domestic political and institutional elites responsible for their decline, fostering distrust of elites (internal blame attribution). Similarly, external groups such as immigrants may be scapegoated for the individual’s economic and social troubles, leading to anti-immigration attitudes (external blame attribution).
Moderation
It is also important to examine the factors that may have an effect on the strength of the relationship between downward class mobility and far-right party support. At the individual level, the four types of attitudes we discussed in the context of mediation, could also potentially moderate the effects.
Thus, for instance, one could imagine that the effect of class decline may be stronger among individuals who report low levels of life satisfaction, are already highly economically insecure, and/or distrustful of politics and institutions. Conversely, individuals with favourable views of immigration would be less likely to support anti-immigrant far-right parties even if they experienced downward mobility.
At the national level, citizens are likely to be affected by the context in which they live, because they tend to compare their own experiences with others’ and thus perceive these experiences not in isolation but vis-à-vis a more generalised sense of how their own situation fares within the broader context. Contextual developments about class mobility can contribute to a generalised sense of societal decline or affluence against which individuals are likely to compare to their own class circumstances.
If downward class mobility takes place in the context of widely prevalent downward mobility, then psychologically, the adverse effect on downward mobility might not be as strong. Its effect is likely to be stronger in a context where downward mobility is generally low, or when upward mobility is common, as individuals may feel singled out in their trajectory of decline.
Findings
Drawing on this framework, we derive a series of hypotheses about the potential link between actual intergenerational class mobility and far-right support and test them using data from the European Social Survey (ESS). We employ Diagonal Reference Models (DRMs), a specialised statistical approach prevalent in quantitative sociology literature which makes it possible to disentangle the effects of origin and class mobility. This allows us to estimate the association between class mobility and voting for far-right parties while distinguishing it from the effects of origin and destination class.
Our findings show that downward class mobility significantly affects far-right voting but only under specific conditions. First, only downward mobility from the salariat class to the working class is significantly associated with far-right support, suggesting that this trajectory likely involves a more significant loss in both status and economic security compared to other forms of downward mobility.
The salariat class is typically associated with higher levels of education, income and job security, as well as greater access to social networks and cultural capital. Falling from this position to the working class can thus represent a dramatic decline in social status, leading to feelings of disillusionment, resentment and alienation. These emotional and psychological responses are fertile ground for far-right narratives, which often capitalise on feelings of loss and grievance.
Second, downward class mobility is more likely to be associated with far-right party support through mechanisms such as discontent and loss rather than blame attribution, suggesting that the class route to far-right voting is largely linked to existential and material issues.
This complements theoretical approaches that focus on overall wellbeing and life satisfaction, social status decline and economic insecurity. It also points to the possibility that the effects of position and mobility are associated with far-right party voting via different attitudinal mechanisms and provides a novel explanation for how social class may itself partly shape the attitudes that had been shown to influence far-right party voting.
Third, overall national-level mobility moderates the effect of downward mobility, but mobility effects do not vary depending on individual characteristics. We can interpret this finding by the adverse psychological effect of downward mobility on an individual being less strong in a country with widespread downward mobility than in a country where most people have not experienced downward class mobility.
Does this matter for far-right party success?
Our results suggest that downward class mobility is an important predictor of far-right party support. What role does this trajectory play, however, in the electoral success of these parties?
Research suggests that it is important to distinguish analytically between “support” and “success”, or in other words between the predictive power of certain characteristics. It is necessary to know how strongly associated these characteristics are with an outcome – in this case downward class mobility – and the substantive importance of this characteristic for the phenomenon in question, in this case, how widespread these characteristics are among the far-right voter pool.
To assess the extent to which downward class mobility is an important factor for far-right party success, we examine the share of downwardly mobile individuals in the far-right electorate (Figure 2). This analysis shows that while individuals from salariat origin and working-class destination are the most likely far-right supporters, these individuals constitute only a small percentage of the far-right electorate.
Figure 2: Class mobility among non-far-right voters and far-right voters
Note: For more information, see the authors’ accompanying paper in Political Behavior.
Does this mean they don’t matter for far-right party success? Not necessarily. While the group of downwardly mobile individuals is not large enough in itself to serve as a primary driver of far-right electoral success, it represents a key subgroup within the, often larger, coalition of economically disaffected voters that allow far-right parties to broaden their electoral base beyond their core supporters.
In summary, downward class mobility, particularly from higher to lower occupational classes, can significantly increase support for far-right parties. This relationship is primarily driven by material loss and life dissatisfaction and is strongest in societies where such mobility is uncommon. These results highlight the importance of considering not just where individuals are located in the class structure but also how they got there, and the emotional and economic toll of downward mobility in shaping political preferences.
For more information, see the authors’ accompanying paper in Political Behavior.
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Ryan Nash Photography / Shutterstock.com