Two cardinal principles of international law emerging from the defeat of Nazism in 1945 were territorial integrity and self-determination in the sense of the political independence of equal sovereign states. It is, therefore, perhaps surprising to be considering the contemporary resonances of prominent Nazi spatial theories associated with its aggressive, territorially expansionist program. Nonetheless, in this post, I examine two concepts which were central to Nazi ideology and its advocacy for the expansion of German territory. I suggest that these concepts of Lebensraum and Großraum – which were intrinsically linked to justifications for territorial acquisition, have affinities with contemporary arguments made for demanding territorial change and new arrangements for protecting the interests of powerful states, expansively conceived. I suggest that revisiting and better understanding these notions helps us grasp how such legal ideologies can resurface in novel ways during contemporary contexts, often under different guises but with similar underlying logics. I describe some of these theories to highlight their affinities with the current discourses of territorial expansion and acquisition.
Lebensraum
The phrase “Living space” (originally Lebensraum) still conjures up images of tanks rolling eastward, genocidal plans and a warped idea that the “Aryan race” needed elbow room at the expense of millions of lives. It was German geographer and ethnographer Friedrich Ratzel who coined the term in 1901. His work was heavily inspired by that of Darwin’s, and particularly his theory of natural selection. He proceeded to transpose it to nation-states, contending that they, too, much like the species Darwin studied, struggled over resources for survival where only the fittest would win. This would later lead to fantasized narratives centered around the idea that areas in Eastern Europe were historically German lands, squandered on “races” deemed “inferior” such as Slavs and Jews.
In practice, Lebensraum required a process of deterritorialization (removing local populations) and reterritorialization (settling in another people in newly acquired lands). World War I’s aftermath and the profound sense of loss intensified the belief among Nazis that nothing can save Germany except a genuine expansion of her Lebensraum and the unconditional return of her old colonies. This logic required that this new fantasized empire be consolidated into one compact mass on the European continent. Karl Haushofer, a Professor of Geography at Munich University, is the one attributed with introducing to Hitler Ratzel’s work on Lebensraum which eventually found its way into Mein Kampf. But while Lebensraum had significant political and ideological implications, it was not developed as a legal theory, contrary to the concept of Großraum.
Großraum
Großraum (Greater space) was theorized by prominent German Nazi jurist, anti-Semite and political theorist Carl Schmitt in 1939 (for an interesting debate on “cancelling” Schmitt, see here and here). Schmitt believed that the international order was moving (back) to spatial formations exceeding the territory of the state. His Großraum theory goes as follows: a predominant power (the Reich) exists within a larger territorial space (the Großraum), in which it essentially acts as hegemon. This larger space should be characterised by sufficient cultural homogeneity to allow the “political idea” of the Reich to unify. The Reich is charged both with choosing the ideological setting for its Großraum, and with asserting the power to decide on the external orientation of the Großraum as a whole. The Großraum is intended as a spatial category, set to replace the state which Schmitt perceived as increasingly failing at representing a concrete spatial reality.
This Großraum-based order was to replace the principle of equality of sovereign states with a set of hierarchies between hegemonic states and subjugated states in different macroregions of the earth, thereby countering what he perceived as the inadequacies of the universalist liberal or Marxist-Leninist ideologies. The racial superiority component was not an essential element of Schmitt’s Großraum, contrary to the bio-centric notion of Lebensraum, but could nonetheless be easily adjusted to accommodate Nazi racial fantasies. Thus, in practice, the line between the two theories is blurry. The concept served to legitimize aggressive policies against non-homogeneous states and minorities within Europe, framing them within a legalistic narrative that supported German hegemony.
But Schmitt’s ideas were not entirely new, as they drew inspiration from the 1823 Monroe Doctrine to illustrate how a Großraum could function as a sphere free from external interference, thus establishing a new legal order based on regional hegemony rather than universal principles. According to Schmitt, the Monroe Doctrine had three important consequences in international law: that American states were to be considered independent (1), that colonisation (2) and intervention in their territory by non-American powers was off limits (3), also implying reciprocal non-intervention by American powers outside American territory.
The Monroe Doctrine was not based on a treaty between legal subjects; its meaning was defined, interpreted and implemented solely by its political subject – that is, the United States. Schmitt’s conception of Großraum is also close to the notion of spheres of influence. Both concepts pertain to geopolitical influence but differ significantly in their implications. While Großraum refers to a structured geopolitical order dominated by a single power over a defined area, emphasizing legal and political frameworks, a sphere of influence describes a region where a state or organization exerts significant cultural, economic, or political influence without necessarily having direct control, making it a more fluid and less formalized concept (see W. Schoenborn, “La Nature Juridique du Territoire”, Hague Recueil (30), 1929-V, pp. 169-177). In other words, spheres of influence are a non-territorial form of domination, gentler in some respects, also less costly for its beneficiary, as they don’t require direct territorial and human administration. But both share similar issues from a legal perspective: they do not always correspond to formal treaties or alliances, and can manifest through informal arrangements that recognize a state’s predominant power over another without outright annexation.
Schmitt’s theory was not mere a scholarly achievement but a militant formulation and justification of a new state of affairs that could/would succeed the moribund jus publicum Europaeum. Schmitt, a staunch anti-positivist, had an anticipatory approach to international law, suggesting Großraum was his attempt at identifying the birth pangs of a new order. It remains nonetheless hard to see how Großraum is something quantitatively distinct from an enlarged state, and this lack of clarity brings it closer to Lebensraum. Its legal faults even prompted one of Kelsen’s most prominent students, Josef L. Kunz, upon reading and commenting on Schmitt’s work on Großraum, to disdain Schmitt by writing that “Carl Schmitt, professor of law, has, of course, never been a jurist, but a politician” and that his work “was not a study in international law, but a political thing”.
Contemporary Expansionist Narratives
One cannot help but see affinities between these theories and today’s international legal order and practice. For instance, the Charter and subsequent practice have favoured regionalism, and in spite of initially rebuking the idea of spheres of influence (see for example A/RES/291(IV)) have ended up (unintentionally) fulfilling some of Schmitt’s ideas. This can be seen notably through the formation of regional treaties that gave a legal body to what was once considered a sphere of influence, such as NATO, the (defunct) Warsaw Pact (see C. Chaumont’s Cours Général de Droit International Public, Hague Recueil (129), 1970-I, pp. 351-353) or more recent formations such as the African Union or the GCC, and through article 52 of the Charter that gives purpose to such regional arrangements or agencies within the UN’S international peace and security framework.
Some have suggested this is a matter of realism, stating that the horizontality of the international legal order is anachronistic and that “The United States and, as an emerging superpower, China whose zones of influence transcend their national borders, are not “states” in the same sense that the Vatican or Monaco are “states””. The Großraum model has been, in a sense, disconnected from its association with Nazi legal theory – as it is now overtly cited and associated with the idea of multipolarity and regionalism within the international legal order.
But this is a slippery slope, as some powerful states – modern Reich contenders if we were to adopt Schmitt’s terminology – have been recently both vocal and active in expanding their territories/influence, starting with Trump’s most recent comments in relation to Greenland and the Panama Canal, Russia’s pattern of war and land grabbing against its “Near Abroad”, China’s territorial and maritime expansions at the great expense of its smaller neighbours (see examples here, here and here), Israel’s ever-expanding territory, particularly following the 1967 Six-Day War when it captured significant territories such as the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip (see the I.C.J’s 2024 advisory opinion for a thorough recount of events), and Erdogan’s recent statement declaring that Turkey could not be “confined” to its borders, mentioning Turkish presence in Syria, Libya, and Somalia. Some analysts even drew parallels between the aforementioned behaviors and Nazi spatial theories (regarding Israel, see here, here and here; regarding Russia, see here and here).
It is worth noting here that both Schmitt and Ratzel saw that their world was experiencing a revolution of spatial consciousness analogous to that which occurred in the sixteenth century. The current wave of increased territorial appetite among powerful states could be an omen somewhere down the line for such a revolution if left untreated. It’s one thing to admit to political realities that sometimes supersede legal principles, but that is precisely why it remains of the utmost importance to hold on to certain principles – including equal sovereignty, self-determination, and territorial integrity – because it helps keep that realism in check.
