Introduction
On 7 May 2025, the EFTA Court delivered a judgment that is likely to become a landmark in its jurisprudence. In TC and AA (Joined Cases E-1/24 and E-7/24), the Court clarified several unresolved issues of EEA and EU law, including the role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights under the EEA Agreement and the scope of the right of access to beneficial ownership information in the field of anti-money laundering (AML).
The main proceedings concerned two individuals who claimed to be victims of financial fraud. In order to substantiate their claims and prepare for litigation, they sought access to information from Liechtenstein’s Register of Beneficial Owners of Legal Entities as prescribed by Directive 2015/849 (the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, ‘AMLD IV’).
In AA (Case E-7/24), the competent authority rejected the request on the ground that the applicant was not typically involved in the fight against money laundering and therefore lacked a legitimate interest. In TC (Case E-1/24), the request was denied because the applicant had only identified the alleged beneficial owners without specifying the legal entities whose data was to be disclosed.
The EFTA Court was thus called upon to answer two main questions of interpretation: who may access beneficial ownership information and what procedural conditions apply.
AMLD V and the Charter in the EEA
As a preliminary matter, the EFTA Court assessed the legal status of Article 1(15)(c) of Directive 2018/843 (‘AMLD V’) within the EEA context. Article 30(5)(c) of AMLD IV had originally granted access to beneficial ownership information to persons and organisations able to demonstrate a legitimate interest. Article 1(15)(c) of AMLD V amended this provision by requiring that information be accessible to any member of the general public. In Luxembourg Business Registers (Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20), the ECJ annulled the amended provision for constituting a disproportionate interference with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter (respect for private and family life and protection of personal data).
As AMLD V had been incorporated into the EEA Agreement, while the Charter had not, Article 1(15)(c) of AMLD V formally remained in force as part of EEA law. Since the EEA framework does not provide for an annulment procedure equivalent to Article 263 TFEU, the EFTA Court approached the issue as a matter of interpretation. It held that Article 30(5)(c) of AMLD IV, as amended, must be interpreted narrowly and, in effect, contra legem – in line with the wording prior to the adoption of AMLD V. This interpretation rested on two key considerations: the objective of homogeneity and the protection of fundamental rights.
At the outset, the EFTA Court recalled that the overarching aim of the EEA Agreement is to establish a homogeneous European Economic Area based on common rules and equal competition. In keeping with settled case-law, only differences in scope and purpose may constitute compelling grounds for divergent interpretations between EU and EEA law (Joined Cases E-9/07 and E-10/07 L’Oréal).
The EFTA Court further observed that, under EU law, the Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties and applies in all situations governed by EU law. Importantly, since the Charter informs the interpretation of EU legislative acts, irrespective of their EEA relevance, as well as Treaty provisions that reflect the main part of the EEA Agreement, it may likewise be relevant in interpreting EEA law.
The EFTA Court reinforced this position by referring to the preamble of the Agreement, which explicitly states that the EEA shall contribute to a Europe built on human rights. For the purpose of recognising the fundamental rights forming part of the general principles of EEA law, the EFTA Court has previously recognised the relevance of the Charter alongside the ECHR (Case E-15/24 A v B).
Against this backdrop, the EFTA Court concluded that there were ‘no compelling grounds under EEA law to consider that the fundamental rights protection guaranteed under EEA law differs in this case from what is applicable as a matter of EU law’. Article 30(5)(c) of AMLD IV, as amended, therefore had to be interpreted as continuing to require applicants to demonstrate a legitimate interest.
Right of Access to Beneficial Ownership Information
The EFTA Court then turned to the questions referred. It noted at the outset that the AML framework is an important instrument for safeguarding the financial system against money laundering and terrorist financing. In order to enhance transparency and prevent the misuse of legal entities, Article 30(5)(c) of AMLD IV provides that access to beneficial ownership information shall be granted to any person or organisation able to demonstrate a legitimate interest.
As regards the question of who may access information, the EFTA Court interpreted the concept of ‘legitimate interest’ as covering any natural or legal person who can demonstrate such an interest with respect to the purpose of the directive. The decisive factor is whether the applicant has shown that the information will be used to address money laundering, terrorist financing and associated predicate offences, which must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Turning to the question of how individuals may access information, the EFTA Court held that under Article 30(5)(c) of AMLD IV, the demonstration of a legitimate interest is the sole substantive criterion and that national legislatures have a degree of latitude in deciding the procedures to be followed. When exercising that power, however, EEA States must comply with EEA law, in particular the principle of effectiveness.
The EFTA Court observed, in this respect, that applicants may not always be able to identify a specific legal entity, especially where beneficial owners have sought to conceal their interests behind complex corporate structures. Given that the name of a natural person may sometimes be the only connecting factor to relevant legal entities, EEA States may be required to permit so-called ‘cross’ or ‘reverse’ searches in national registers to ensure the right of access is fully effective.
The EFTA Court reinforced this interpretation by noting that a rigid procedural requirement to always specify the legal entity could also impede the crucial efforts of the press and civil society organisations to prevent, investigate, and detect money laundering and terrorist financing. It added that the right to information is inherent to the freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR (and thus also Article 11 of the Charter).
Finally, the EFTA Court clarified that such an interpretation is consistent with the ECJ’s judgment in Luxembourg Business Registers. Unlike the public access regime introduced by AMLD V, the EFTA Court’s interpretation restricts access to cases in which a legitimate interest has been demonstrated, thereby ensuring that personal data are disclosed only where it is appropriate, necessary, and proportionate to the aim pursued.
Final Remarks
In conclusion, the EFTA Court’s judgment stands out not only for its engagement with unresolved questions of EEA law but for its clarifications of the AML framework.
Of particular interest is the EFTA Court’s rejection of the argument that divergent interpretations between EU and EEA law can be justified solely on the basis that the Charter does not apply to the EFTA States. The Court has previously sought to bridge the fundamental rights gap between the EU and EFTA pillars by relying on corresponding provisions of the ECHR. However, given that the Charter forms an integral part of the EU’s constitutional framework and must logically be taken into account to ensure homogeneity within the EEA, the mere absence of an ECHR counterpart is insufficient to justify divergence. This is all the more convincing given that the Charter codifies common constitutional traditions and widely recognised human rights instruments to which the EFTA States are also signatories. The EFTA Court thus appears to have taken an important step towards recognising the Charter as an independent source of EEA law, thereby strengthening the special relationship between the EU, its Member States and the EFTA States based on proximity, long-standing common values and European identity.
Equally noteworthy is the EFTA Court’s recognition of access to beneficial ownership information as an individual right under the AML framework, providing much-needed clarity in the aftermath of the ECJ’s judgment in Luxembourg Business Registers. While some EEA States have maintained public access to their national registers, others, such as Norway, have imposed restrictions. The EFTA Court confirms, first, that the AML framework does not, as such, prevent EEA States from granting broader access for other purposes, provided that data protection rules are respected. Second, it emphasises that access to information is not simply a matter of balancing privacy rights against the public interest in combating money laundering and terrorist financing, but must also be understood in the context of the right to information, an inherent component of the freedom of expression. The judgment is therefore likely to serve as a valuable point of reference for transparency supporters.