Civilian harm in armed conflict has reached staggering levels. The United Nations recently recorded a 72% increase in civilian casualties worldwide, a stark reminder of the devastating human toll of modern warfare. Yet, mechanisms to provide justice and redress for those harmed remain inadequate. Recent developments, including the International Law Commission’s (ILC) renewed focus on state responsibility and reparations for wrongful acts, and the US’ Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, underscore the growing imperative to address this accountability gap. For some states, this moral argument is augmented by the strategic case that adequate reparation is imperative to winning the hearts and minds of local populations.
This post highlights the urgent need for reparations frameworks that provide practical and timely redress for civilians harmed during armed conflict. Drawing on comparative insights from the US, the Netherlands, and Israel, it critiques the UK’s existing approach and identifies actionable pathways for reform.
Promise and Perils in Existing Legal Frameworks
Reparations for civilian harm in warfare is a complex matter to navigate. This complexity partially stems from the governance of reparations by different bodies of laws—from international law and international human rights law, through administrative law to domestic tort law—but also due to multiple meanings of ‘reparations’ (for example: here, here, and here). Indeed, what amounts to civilian harm could extend beyond immediate loss of life, bodily integrity, or individuals’ property to include long-term effects such as environmental damage, infrastructure collapse, and socio-economic decline. Opinions also diverge as to whether reparations ought to be made only in instances in which civilian harm was caused through unlawful or wrongful conduct (for example here and here), or to address any harm caused to civilians due to warfare regardless of compliance with international law or tort law norms (for example here and here).
Consider international humanitarian law (IHL). It mandates that states take ‘constant care’ to spare civilian lives and property. The principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions require parties to a conflict to minimize harm and avoid attacks likely to result in excessive civilian damage. Yet, implementation of these obligations, as well as reparations for civilian harm caused, is often inconsistent and delayed, particularly in protracted conflicts where accountability is deprioritized. Moreover, as a recent ILC report on compensation for damage caused by internationally wrongful acts demonstrates, while state practice and tribunal decisions on the matter have grown in recent years, the approach under international law is far from settled and detailed clear principles are in need. Even if an elaborate and unified set of reparations norms existed under international law, systemic investigative failures—such as delayed or inadequate fact-finding—could undermine delivering adequate reparations.
Similarly, domestic tort law could offer an avenue for obtaining some form of reparations, though not without limitations. The recent decision by Judge Leonie M. Brinkema of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in the case of Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology Inc., demonstrates the potential of tort law. In this case, three plaintiffs sued CACI, a Virginia-based government contractor, arguing that its employees helped military personnel commit torture the plaintiffs when they were detained at Abu Ghraib in 2003 and 2004. The claim was filed in 2008, but it wasn’t until 2024 that the district court reached a substantive conclusion and awarded $42 million in damages against the private contractor. The 16 years in between were laced with multiple procedural hurdles the plaintiffs needed to overcome, most significantly the defendant’s arguments about enjoying a derivative immunity. Victories, such as the one in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology Inc., are rare despite the potential tort law holds for civilians in conflict zones, as states tend to grant themselves vast immunities for losses they inflict in and around the battlefield.
Lessons from Comparative Practice
Despite these shortcomings, there are valuable lessons to be drawn from international practice. In the Netherlands, individuals have successfully claimed reparations through domestic, civil, court cases. Examples of this have been visible with claims originating from the Chora case, the Mothers of Srebrenica cases and there is a current, ongoing procedure related to the strike in Hawija that killed 70 civilians. Key in all these considerations has been that the Dutch legal system allows for a very broad definition of wrongful act, leading to courts being able to judicially review these acts.
Other states have steered away from legal accountability, instead embracing a more fluid structure of compensation. In recent years, ex-gratia payments had become wide practice, in which commanders, at their discretion, could award compensation for damage done. Whereas these were not exactly similar to reparations, they did represent an engagement of states with the harm done and a first avenue through which compensation could be offered. Yet, states often drafted policy on an ad hoc basis, with so far only the US offering something in the way of actual policy.
This seems to underscore a more recent trend to, in broader lines, consider the harm of military operations. Another example is the US Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, which offers a framework aimed at minimizing civilian harm in military operations (although it is uncertain how long this will remain funded) and the Netherlands have recently opened a portal through which suspected civilian harm can be reported. The Netherlands and the US approaches demonstrate how the moral and legal value in advancing reparations schemes for civilian harm, and even a tactical significance as reparations could be a means of ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the local population, could be operationalized.
Yet, in other jurisdictions, we have consistently seen victims struggle to gain any form of reparations and law being used in a more aggressive manner. In January 2025, the Supreme Court of Israel dismissed a petition of the Palestinian Authority (PA), holding that two recent legislative amendments—which allow courts to impose punitive damages on the PA, creating an irrefutable presumption of liability, and allows awards to be paid from the PA’s frozen funds held by Israel’s treasury—are constitutional. This ruling is a recent development in a long line of court decisions and legislative measures that minimize Israel’s liability towards Palestinians while expanding the PA’s liability towards Israelis.
The UK’s Accountability and Reparations Framework
The UK’s current framework lags behind more progressive models. Despite celebrating a proud adherence to compliance with IHL and upholding international law, the last two decades have laid bare multiple gaps between this rhetoric and the reality of implementing an effective accountability and reparation framework. From the point that civilian harm is caused challenges emerge with the UK practice, beginning with the recording of civilian casualties. Sir John Chilcot noted in the Iraq Inquiry Report that the government’s ‘consideration of the issue of Iraqi civilian casualties was driven by its concern to rebut accusations that Coalition Forces were responsible for the deaths of large numbers of civilians, and to sustain domestic support for operations in Iraq.’ A decade later, significant questions were raised about the capacity, and willingness, for the accurate recording of civilian harm in engagement against Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. British Forces initially reported that they had caused no civilian casualties whatsoever. This claim of the ‘perfect war’, which was later revised to one death, was challenged by an extensive investigation conducted by Airwars and The Guardian.
Where harm has been acknowledged, there have been failures by varying levels of British authorities to establish effective and independent investigations, leading to subsequent costly and time-consuming independent inquiries, including public inquiries. In turn, these processes have been hampered by accusations of political and military pressure, as in the case of the closure of Operation Northmoor into crimes committed by UK Forces in Afghanistan, and IHAT in respect of Iraq. Both investigations closed without a single prosecution.
There have been further recurring challenges noted with a lack of effective initial investigations including in forensic data and record-keeping soon after the relevant attack, and a lack of transparency in the UK’s investigatory practice. The result has been an often-delayed trudge towards justice with repeat instances of investigation and re-investigation. Indeed, the Haddon-Cave Inquiry is currently hearing damning testimony in respect of extra-judicial killings by UK Special Forces in Afghanistan between 2010 and 2013. Rather than address the existing deficiencies in its accountability and reparations framework, the previous government introduced the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021 which inter alia placed a presumption against criminal prosecution if more than 5 years have passed since an alleged incident, and a long-stop of 6 years on civil claims.
On compensation, victims have sought payment through two channels. While the first, litigation in UK courts, tends to result in higher payments, it is steeped in procedural and practical difficulties for claimants, and the enactment of the Overseas Operations Act makes these avenues more challenging. A second channel of official practice is through designated schemes. For instance, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq saw the establishment Area Claims Officers (ACO) who could make payments in theatre. These would either be made as compensation, through public liability payments, where the government accepted that it may be held legally liable for the harm in question, or as ex gratia payments to those who had suffered harm or damage because of UK military activities. The MoD is reported to have adopted this latter practice in cases where there was a ‘major threat to the stabilization effort’ and yet where it was ‘impossible to form a view on strict legal liability’. These were termed as goodwill gestures and would be paid at local compensation rates, which were often far lower than what would be awarded in civil litigation.
In the absence of a coherent reparations mechanism some of the payments appear derisory and inconsistent. Research conducted by Action on Armed Violence and the Guardian note considerable disparities in the amounts paid with one family receiving only £542 for the death of their daughter, and another given merely £104 for a confirmed fatality which included property damage. It was noted how this life was valued less than that paid elsewhere for a herd of donkeys and lost mobile phone. A report for The Independent noted that the UK was more likely to pay civilian compensation in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan for a road-traffic collision, than for the destruction of their homes.
Proposed Pathways for Reform
A first step toward meaningful reform in the United Kingdom could be the establishment of a statutory reparations mechanism for civilians harmed during military operations. Its exact structure could not only provide compensation, but also recognize and address victims’ rights to truth and accountability, or integrate provisions for proactive tracking of civilian harm and clear guidelines for assessing claims.
The basis of reparations for civilian harm in warfare has been approached differently across jurisdictions and tribunals, most notably in relation to whether eligibility for reparations requires establishing that a legal norm was violated or that the harm was caused by a specific identifiable actor. Given the nature of combat, a mechanism that requires proving both a violation of a legal norm and causation of harm by a specific individual is likely to be able to offer redress in a limited number of cases. In contrast, a mechanism that offers reparations when an individual could show that their harm was caused by the UK operations in armed conflict, without requiring proof of breach of norms or naming an individual actor, would be able to provide redress to a wider range of harms. Research has identified the moral, practical, and tactical benefits of providing reparations for civilian harm, and by advancing an appropriate model the UK could play a leading role in shaping policy in this area (see for example here, here, and here).
Strengthening the independence and transparency of investigations is also essential. Investigative processes should adhere to international standards, ensuring impartiality and thorough fact-finding. For example, battle damage assessments (BDAs) and credible allegations of harm could automatically trigger comprehensive reviews, with findings subjected to public scrutiny where appropriate. Transparent investigations will help rebuild trust and signal a commitment to accountability. Data from these reviews—disaggregated by age, gender, and other factors—could then inform operational decisions and prevent recurring harm. The Political Declaration on Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas provides a useful model for integrating these practices into operational planning.
Finally, reparations frameworks should also be informed by the voices and needs of affected communities. Victim participation can ensure that reparations mechanisms address grievances effectively and foster broader societal acknowledgment of harm and reconciliation. This emphasises a need for victims to be able to be heard and be able to take part in a meaningful fashion in these processes. Agency should not be limited to them being only a witness, but also be able to use a mechanism as a way of advocating for their needs.
Conclusion
As civilian casualties continue to rise, states must prioritize accountability and reparations. There is a moral, legal and strategic imperative for reform. By adopting proactive, transparent, and victim-centered frameworks, the UK can set a new standard for accountability in armed conflict. This moment of renewed international attention offers a critical opportunity to bridge the accountability gap and provide justice for those who have borne the brunt of war. It is an opportunity the UK cannot afford to miss.
* Disclosure, the authors are part of an international group of expert academics, practitioners, and non-governmental organizations who are currently working on a project aimed at advancing legislative amendments that will provide reparations for civilians harmed by the UK’s involvement in warfare. Our project is funded by the UKRI-AHRC. The opinions expressed in this blog are the writers’ own views.
