Serbia’s unprecedented protests against Aleksandar Vučić’s regime are unlikely to lead to real change unless the opposition rises to the occasion, argues Filip Milacic.
Serbia has been rocked by massive student-led protests, triggered by the deaths of 15 people following the collapse of the canopy of the Novi Sad railway station and the government’s reluctance to hold those responsible to account. The protests reached a crescendo on 15 March when tens of thousands of Serbs took to the streets of Belgrade to demand the rule of law and an end to impunity.
The 15 March demonstration, which was probably the largest in Serbia’s history, surpassing even the protest that brought down Slobodan Milošević’s regime in 2000, raised hopes of the imminent fall of Aleksandar Vučić’s regime, which has turned Serbia into one of the fastest autocratising countries in the world. But how realistic are these hopes and what might come next?
The protests, organised by students who insist they are above party politics, have clearly shown there is widespread dissatisfaction in Serbian society with the current government, led by Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). But this alone is not enough. Theories of democratic resistance tell us that there are, in principle, three ways to remove an authoritarian incumbent.
Violent removal
Scenario 1 would involve Vučić’s violent removal from power by protesters, with the help of the security forces. Such a scenario is unlikely and should not be welcomed. It would have a negative impact on the future prospects of Serbian democracy and diminish the chances of establishing a sustainable democracy in the future. Despite its many shortcomings, Serbia is not a hard autocracy like Russia where a violent overthrow could be legitimate, but rather an electoral autocracy or a competitive authoritarian regime.
Power is highly concentrated in Vučić’s hands, checks and balances have been largely dismantled, many civil liberties have been curtailed (foremost media freedom) and the opposition competes on an uneven playing field. However, Serbian elections are still competitive. The opposition is allowed to compete, its candidates are not murdered as they were under Milošević, and civil liberties such as freedom of association and assembly are largely respected.
Political defections
In scenario 2, the protests would lead to the defection of the SNS’s coalition partners and some SNS officials. This would in turn enable the formation of a new parliamentary majority, which would form a temporary government to prepare new elections on a more level playing field.
Although Serbia’s government resigned on 19 March and there are rumours of disagreements within the SNS, there are no signs of defections to the opposition camp. This is because an important factor in elite defection – strong support for local democratic forces by external pro-democracy actors – is currently absent in Serbia. Indeed, the US hasn’t intervened on behalf of the pro-democracy forces or supported their struggle. On the contrary, US officials expressed their support for Vučić’s regime.
Richard Grenell, special envoy of President Donald Trump, criticised the allegedly violent nature of the students’ struggle against autocracy, while Donald Trump Jr. supported Vučić’s view that the protests are a so-called “colour revolution”. The other major external pro-democracy actor – the European Union – remains either silent or vague when commenting on developments in Serbia.
Victory for the opposition
In scenario 3, the protests would pave the way for change at the ballot box. In other words, they would help the opposition parties to defeat Vučić and his SNS in an election. As noted above, elections in Serbia are marred by significant manipulation by the ruling parties. This is precisely why Vučić is likely to organise early elections as a way out of the crisis – something he has already hinted at.
And since Vučić is unlikely to improve the electoral conditions because he is not under pressure from the West and no longer has to fear for his international legitimacy, the Serbian opposition parties will most likely boycott the election.
But even under such conditions, Vučić is not unbeatable. The experience of other countries shows that the pro-democracy opposition can beat an authoritarian incumbent even under worse electoral conditions than Serbia’s (such as in the landslide victory of the Turkish opposition in the country’s 2024 local elections).
For this to happen in Serbia, Serbian opposition parties will have to change their approach significantly. If Vučić does organise early elections, the opposition parties should not boycott the vote and instead lead resistance at the ballot box. They should also fight for a more level playing field by developing creative and effective ways to counter the government’s electoral manipulations.
Although the current protests are unprecedented, there have been other popular mobilisations against the regime organised by civil society. However, the opposition has never been able to translate the deep discontent on the streets into an electoral victory.
Therefore, for the next elections, civil society and the pro-democracy opposition should develop a common alternative platform that addresses the socio-economic and cultural concerns of the electorate. The opposition parties should also acknowledge to Serbian voters their mistakes that led to Vučić’s rise to power in the first place.
A new narrative
One of Vučić’s key tools for staying in power is his narrative of protecting the country from external and internal enemies, as well as Serbia’s national interests on the Kosovo issue. This image of Vučić as the “saviour” of Kosovo and the defender of an endangered Serbian nation is coupled with the portrayal of the opposition as traitors and enemies of the nation.
To defeat Vučić in the election, the Serbian opposition needs to develop its own emotionally compelling, patriotic counter-narrative. Such a narrative should address the root of democratic backsliding – the Kosovo issue – which the pro-democracy opposition has so far ignored. It must also encompass the social cleavage between autocracy and democracy, presenting the struggle for democracy and the rule of law as a struggle for the Serbian nation.
Vučić is facing the biggest challenge to his regime since coming to power in 2012. However, as theories of democratic resistance tell us, it is unlikely we will see the end of his regime any time soon unless the Serbian opposition can step up to the challenge.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Dejan82 / Shutterstock.com
