Protests against Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s regime have spread across Turkey following the arrest of Erdoğan’s political rival Ekrem İmamoğlu. Balki Begumhan Bayhan writes that regardless of what happens next, Erdoğan’s legitimacy has been damaged, perhaps irreparably.
On 19 March, the popular mayor of Istanbul Ekrem İmamoğlu was arrested. İmamoğlu is a member of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and is viewed as a key rival to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Indeed, he was about to be elected virtually unopposed as the CHP presidential candidate for the next Turkish elections, which though not expected until 2028, could potentially be held sooner.
A few days prior to the arrest, in another significant move, İmamoğlu had his bachelor’s degree revoked (a prerequisite for holding the presidential office). The charges against the mayor were on the grounds of “corruption” and “terrorism” but are near-universally viewed as politically motivated.
Anti-regime protests
There has been a strong backlash from the public to the arrest, with huge protests erupting across the country on a level not seen since 2013’s Gezi Park protests. The demonstrations, which are continuing, have taken place not just in the large urban areas which typically supply the bulk of opposition support but also in provincial cities and towns such as Erzurum and Malatya, which have been regarded as strongholds of Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Unrest reached a new peak on 23 March – the day when the court formally arrested and jailed İmamoğlu – with hundreds of thousands of people in Istanbul joining opposition protests. In addition, there was mass turnout in the CHP primary election, with 15 million people (both party members and members of the public) symbolically voting for İmamoğlu despite the fact he was the only candidate.
The regime’s reaction to the protests has been harsh, with more than 1,100 people detained in the first five days and reports of police using pepper spray and water cannons against demonstrators. The government has also cracked down on freedom of speech, with Turkey’s broadcast regulator ordering TV channels to stop live reporting of the protests, and the regime requesting X to block access to over 700 social media accounts.
None of this seems to have reduced popular mobilisation, however, with 24 March seeing mass student protests across the country and the evening turnout at the main Istanbul protest remaining at the previous day’s levels. The continuation and growth of the protests clearly signal that they have moved beyond merely calling for İmamoğlu’s release and into a broader anti-regime agitation.
While the protests certainly signify massive societal dissatisfaction, their chances of succeeding will rely on the opposition forces remaining united and the ability and willingness of the security forces to pursue harsher repression.
Why take action now?
Given the predictable public outcry and the negative impact on Turkey’s already faltering economy, it seems reasonable to ask why Erdoğan decided to make this move. For a start, in İmamoğlu the president sees an opponent with a greater chance of unseating him than ever before.
Part of this is to do with İmamoğlu’s personal appeal, which he demonstrated in his two emphatic mayoral victories in 2019 (where he ended 25 years of AKP control) and 2024. These two victories underlined İmamoğlu’s ability to pull in voters from across Turkey’s traditionally segregated voter groups. While İmamoğlu is a member of the traditionally staunchly secularist CHP, he comes from the conservative Black Sea city of Trabzon.
Controlling Istanbul – by far Turkey’s largest city and the city Erdoğan himself was once mayor of – has given him a platform to grow his popularity nationwide. As the current president once commented, “whoever wins Istanbul, wins Turkey”. Moreover, the broader political situation is seen to be more hostile to the president than ever before, with a declining economy hitting Erdoğan’s popularity hard. Recent polling for the next election put Imamoğlu at 54 per cent to just 39 per cent for Erdoğan.
A revived opposition
There are also signs the CHP is undergoing a broader transformation, with a refreshed leadership, new strategies and a greater level of party unity. In the past, a key problem for the opposition in Turkey has been the opposition itself. Under former leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (who led the party for 13 years), the CHP failed to make national gains and only experienced significant success in the 2019 local elections.
Yet, Kılıçdaroğlu continued his reign as the CHP party leader and, despite widespread criticism, ran as the joint presidential candidate in the 2023 elections. After being defeated by Erdoğan (despite a backdrop of soaring inflation) in one of the most pivotal elections in recent Turkish history, Kilicdaroglu’s refusal to resign following the loss further demoralised opposition voters.
The CHP’s election of a new leader, Özgür Özel, in November 2023, was therefore a significant change that had long been demanded. Unlike Kılıçdaroğlu, Özel has been more content to step back from the limelight and has been much more willing to back those within the party who have broad public appeal and the potential to oppose Erdoğan, including Imamoğlu. The new chairman has also emphasised internal restructuring and re-unifying a divided opposition, even if the depth of some of this has often been exaggerated.
Promising signs that these changes were paying off came in the 2024 local elections, when surpassing all expectations, the CHP performed extremely well. The party kept control of most its municipalities and won 14 additional ones, surpassing the AKP by a million votes, despite a highly uneven playing field. The victory signalled a re-energised opposition and, more importantly, restored hope for the first time in decades that the AKP and Erdoğan could be defeated.
The Trump effect
As these challenges emerged for Erdoğan, other developments in 2025 have given the president greater room for manoeuvre. First, towards the end of last year, the governing parties began tentative discussions about a “new Kurdish peace process” and reconciling with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
In a separate move, Erdoğan has also made attempts to appeal to Kurdish voters, recently celebrating the brotherhood between the Kurds and Turks. This could potentially lead to an accentuation of the divide between the pro-Kurdish DEM Party and the rest of the opposition.
Moreover, Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency has sent a signal to many authoritarian leaders that they can act repressively much more freely and without fear of consequences from the US. With these factors in place, and with a growing threat from Imamoğlu and the CHP, Erdoğan judged that he could strike against his rival without pushback.
What next?
The mobilisation against the regime is certainly on a scale not seen in decades and represents one of the most serious challenges to AKP rule since the party came to power. However, several factors still remain which could frustrate any attempts at regime change in the country.
First, there will be limited appetite for external actors, both in Europe and the US, to encourage the protests, given Turkey’s strategic geopolitical position. Second, the president still has full control of the state security apparatus, which until now seems to be firmly following orders and acting harshly against the protesters. Finally, the question of opposition unity – particularly between Turkish nationalists and Kurdish groups – has not gone away and may even have been accentuated by the potential peace process.
However, there are some signs of hope. It is not clear in the long run how the government can keep a lid on these levels of popular mobilisation, which for the first time seem to be extending into its traditional core constituencies. The CHP has also shown an impressive level of organisation and leadership this time. For instance, the party has organised a boycott of pro-government businesses, demonstrating a willingness to take concrete oppositional steps to an extent not seen previously.
Moreover, despite the opening towards the Kurds, there are signs that the pro-Kurdish DEM Party will remain critical of Erdoğan’s blatant authoritarian moves. After İmamoğlu’s arrest, Özel and the co-leader of the DEM Party, Tuncer Bakırhan, issued a joint statement warning of threats to democracy. Regardless, the protests seem to be showing no signs of dying down, and the political situation in Turkey is the most volatile it has been in many years. Whatever happens, one thing is certain – Erdoğan’s legitimacy has been damaged, perhaps irreparably.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Hamza Yonec / Shutterstock.com
