While the ripples of Verein KlimaSeniorinnen continue to spread in the academic world, with discussions about potential implications for the future jurisprudence of the ECtHR, on January 30, 2025, the Court handed down another landmark judgment in the field of environmental litigation. The case of Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy addressed the systematic and large-scale pollution phenomenon caused by the mismanagement of hazardous waste in parts of the Campania region in the South of Italy. The judgment is ground-breaking for finding a violation of the right to life (Article 2 ECHR) for the first time in connection with environmental pollution (further aspects of the case have been discussed on the blog here).
Furthermore, this was the first major environment-related judgment since the adoption of the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment last April, which allowed the Court to clarify whether its innovative approach to the locus standi could be applied to environmental cases not related to climate change. However, the judgment confirmed that such an approach may not extend to other environmental cases, even if it concerns widespread and large-scale pollution that is intrinsically linked with the triple planetary crisis of climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss. This contribution critically reflects on the Court’s stance on locus standi in the Cannavacciuolo judgment and its implications for the future of environmental litigation before the ECtHR.
Case Background and Judgment
The case – previously referred to as Di Caprio and Others v. Italy – revolved around the so-called “Terra dei Fuochi” (“Land of Fires”) phenomenon on the territory between the province of Naples and the south-western area of the province of Caserta. The pollution stems from the illegal dumping, burying and/or uncontrolled abandonment of hazardous, special and urban waste, often carried out by criminal organised groups in an area with a population of nearly 2,900,000 inhabitants. Scientific studies have identified a causal link between the increase and high rate of cancer mortality – particularly in lung, pleura, larynx, bladder, liver and brain cancers – and the pollution resulting from inappropriate waste management and the existence of illegal rubbish dumps [para. 18]. The long-standing toxic pollution also prompted numerous proceedings at the domestic and EU level, including Commission v. Italy (C-297/08), establishing the State’s failure to adopt the necessary measures to ensure waste collection without endangering human health and harming the environment and Commission v. Italy (C-653/13) pronouncing failure to comply with the prior judgment [paras. 167–173].
The application of the Cannavacciuolo case was brought by individuals and five associations (non-governmental organisations, NGOs) alleging the violation of their right to life (Article 2) and respect for private and family life (Article 8) resulting from the large-scale pollution in the area. The Court carefully examined the victim status of all the applicants [listed in Annex I]. It declared only seven individual applicants’ claims admissible, striking out the NGOs’ and other individuals’ claims who have not resided in the municipalities identified in an inter-ministerial decree or who have failed to comply with the six-month time-limit [paras. 222, 249, and 296].
Regarding the merits of the complaint, the Court first assessed the alleged violation of the right to life. It concluded that such illegal and unregulated dumping of hazardous waste in the present case could be regarded as dangerous activities which pose a risk to human life. Furthermore, the Court noted that the seriousness of the potential harm to human health affecting environmental elements, such as soil, water, and air, is undisputed among the parties [para. 385]. Recognizing pollution from toxic waste dumping as a dangerous activity represents an innovative development in the Court’s jurisprudence. For the first time, the ECtHR deemed such pollution to meet the threshold of the right to life, which requires a “real and imminent” risk to human life. Previously, the Court had primarily addressed environmental hazards under the right to private and family life, emphasising their impact on well-being rather than their direct threat to life, as seen in Di Sarno and Others v. Italy. Furthermore, the Court embraced a systemic approach to environmental protection and human rights and considered recent developments in the case law of other jurisprudences, including the UN Human Rights Committee (Portillo Cáceres v. Paraguay, discussed here) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Advisory Opinion OC-17/23 and La Oroya Population v. Peru, discussed here and here). These developments confirm the growing importance of establishing the duty to protect in light of the principles of prevention and precaution [paras. 179–185].
Having found a violation of Article 2, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the complaint under Article 8. Therefore, the judgment undeniably strengthens the arguments of Judge Serghides about the emergence of a sub-right to a healthy, clean and sustainable environment first pronounced in the concurring opinion in Pavlov and Others v. Russia and Kotov and Others v. Russia under Article 8. The development of such a sub-right is particularly relevant in the European human rights system, as it stands as the only regional human rights framework that does not explicitly recognise environmental rights. Thus, the judgment may provide another impetus for adopting a long-discussed additional protocol on the right to a healthy environment, as it highlights persistent and widespread environmental issues across the European continent that continue to threaten public health and human rights.
The severity and systematic nature of the pollution in the “Terra dei Fuochi” area prompted the Court to adopt a pilot-judgment procedure and urge the State to implement a comprehensive strategy of measures to decontaminate the area, along with establishing a monitoring mechanism and an information platform within the time limit of 2 years. The application of the pilot-judgment procedure in the present case constitutes a ground-breaking development in the Court’s jurisprudence, as it is the first time the ECtHR has used this approach to address a structural problem of environmental protection.
Breaking Ground in Substance, Standing Still on Procedure
While the judgment already represents a milestone in the ECtHR’s environmental jurisprudence for the reasons briefly discussed above, it arguably reflects a step backwards or at least a standstill in terms of standing, particularly in light of KlimaSeniorinnen. Namely, one of the most innovative aspects of the latter judgment was certainly the Court’s flexible stance on the standing of associations in the context of climate change litigation. The Court granted standing to the applicant NGO representing its members (individuals) who, in turn, did not meet the victim status criteria of Article 34 ECHR. As a result, the Court found a violation of the right to private and family life (Article 8) and the right to a fair trial (Article 6).
This conclusion introduced a completely new approach to the standing of NGOs in the ECtHR’s environmental jurisprudence and consequently raised numerous questions as to the prohibition of actio popularis and was also subject to strong criticism, remarkably by Judge Eicke in the partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion on the judgment. Nonetheless, the Court then justified the standing of the applicant NGO by “specific considerations relating to climate change” [KlimaSeniorinnen, para. 498]. However, at the time of the adoption of the judgment, this conclusion necessarily raised the question of whether such an approach would impact the future development of the Court’s jurisprudence concerning widespread environmental degradation, such as pollution and biodiversity loss.
Our question was answered sooner than expected in the recent Cannavacciuolo judgment: the locus standi criteria set out in KlimaSeniorinnen may not apply to other environmental, non-climate related claims, such as the “Terra dei Fuochi” phenomenon. The Court pointed out that its approach to standing in KlimaSeniorinnen had been exceptional and justified by “the specific feature of climate change as a common concern of humankind and the necessity of promoting intergenerational burden-sharing in this context” [KlimaSeniorinnen, paras. 498–499 cited in Cannavacciuolo, paras. 220–222]. This may imply that the Court aims to distinguish between climate change and other forms of environmental harm, easing the locus standi criteria for the former while upholding its strict approach for the latter [as argued in the concurring opinion of Judge Krenc, para. 4 and in the partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion of Judge Serghides, para. 2]. However, the Court did not assess the substantial difference between climate change and large-scale environmental pollution that would reassuringly justify its divergent approach in the two judgments. The high threshold for individual applicants that the Court upheld in Cannavacciuolo is well illustrated in Cordella and Others v. Italy, where the Court excluded 19 out of the 180 applicants from the scope of victims, as they did not live in the towns classified as being at high environmental risk. In contrast, the Court considered the proximity of the applicants’ homes to the sources of pollution as one of the factors to be considered and granted standing to all applicants in the abovementioned Pavlov case. Therefore, even in light of the Court’s previous environmental cases, the Court’s approach seems relatively strict and arguably inconsistent.
However, climate change is not the only severe crisis the planet faces at the moment; it is one element of the triple planetary crisis, along with pollution and biodiversity loss, which has been addressed in the Reykjavík Declaration (2023). Thus, as the concurring opinions of both Judge Krenc and Judge Serghides highlighted, systematic, decade-long, widespread and large-scale pollution, such as that in the “Terra dei Fuochi” area, could also be regarded as part of the global crisis. The judgment, therefore, raises several questions: What “specific feature” of climate change justifies distinguishing it from other environmental crises also affecting millions of people? Furthermore, why are the criteria for standing seemingly more lenient in climate change cases, where individuals currently do not meet the threshold for victim status, unlike large-scale environmental pollution cases with clearly identifiable victims?
In light of the above, it could be concluded that the Cannavacciuolo judgment represents a milestone in the development of the ECtHR’s environmental jurisprudence, primarily for finding the violation of the right to life and applying the pilot judgment procedure, both for the first time. However, it may also spark further debates when contrasted with the Court’s approach to other planetary crises, such as climate change.
