At the end of January 2025, the M23 captured the city of Goma, the largest city in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the region’s humanitarian and security hub. Why does this matter to us international lawyers? It matters for many reasons, not least because this is another escalation in one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises that has cost the lives of millions of people (since 1998) with millions more displaced. The DRC is also host to what was once the UN’s largest peacekeeping operation, MONUSCO, an operation that should have withdrawn in December 2024 yet has remained, fighting alongside the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and SAMIDRC, the South African Development Community (SADC) mission– a battle which resulted in the death of 13 UN peacekeepers in January. This recent escalation of violence, caused by the M23’s offensive, has also led to the severing of diplomatic ties between the DRC and Rwanda, given Rwanda’s backing of the M23, with the DRC government claiming that the capture of Goma is a ‘declaration of war’ by Rwanda. An emergency Security Council meeting held on 26th January called upon the DRC and Rwanda to find a political solution (there had been an ongoing Luanda Peace Process), with Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, stating that the Council must send a ‘clear and unequivocal message to M23 and its backers that actions endangering the lives of civilians and UN peacekeepers will not be tolerated’. This was then followed by a UNSC Resolution (2773) on 21st February 2025 which, amongst other things, reiterated the Council’s ‘deep concern regarding the rapidly deteriorating security and humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC’, including the ongoing offensives and control of key cities by the M23 ‘with the direct support and participation of the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF)’ (the legal issues pertaining to this resolution have been explored elsewhere on this blog).
The rapidly deteriorating situation raises a plethora of questions for international lawyers, including: UN peacekeepers’ use of force, joint operations and the triggering of IHL; whether the death of the 13 peacekeepers constitutes war crimes (as proposed by, amongst others, China’s representative in the Security Council in January); the law of occupation (now that M23, with support from Rwanda, occupies Goma and Bukavu); and if Rwanda’s support of M23 escalates the violence from a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) to an international armed conflict (IAC).
The M23 revival and MONUSCO
The M23 (Mouvement du 23 Mars) is an armed group which emerged in the DRC in the early 2010s, composed of former CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People) rebels. The group is responsible for serious violations of international law (including attacks on civilians, journalists and activists, sexual violence and abduction) and has led extensive forced recruitment campaigns of children whilst launching numerous offensives to claim territory in Congo’s mineral-rich eastern provinces. It claims its objective is to safeguard the interests of the Congolese Tutsi and other minorities in eastern Congo, including protecting them against Hutu rebels who fled to the DRC after the 1994 Rwandan genocide – hence, the support of Rwanda. Indeed, several reports state that M23 receives general military supplies (weapons and ammunition) from the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF), with a UN Group of Experts estimating that 3000-4000 Rwandan government forces were operating with M23 in eastern DRC in June last year. Rwanda has typically consistently denied its involvement, although its representative in January’s emergency Council meeting accused the DRC of failing to de-escalate the situation, whilst also raising concerns about the role of MONUSCO, noting that the peace operation was ‘at risk of being sucked into a conflict in which it would be a belligerent force’.
Indeed, the M23’s recent capture of Goma is somewhat of a déjà vu moment for the Congo and MONUSCO peacekeepers. In 2013 the group temporarily captured the city after a campaign of violence to claim territory in the east. This led to the deployment of the UN’s infamous ‘Force Intervention Brigade’ (FIB) in March 2013, an offensive combat force, attached to MONUSCO, which was mandated to carry out ‘targeted offensive operations’ to ‘neutralise’ and ‘disarm’ armed groups, including M23. The FIB raised numerous legal and normative questions for the UN and was arguably a conscious departure from the fundamental principles of peacekeeping. Whilst the FIB was initially successful in removing M23 from eastern DRC, the group launched a resurgence in 2022 with an offensive in North Kivu against the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and MONUSCO, taking control of Rubaya, a key coltan mining town. Over the past two years, the group’s campaign has gradually escalated, resulting in the latest period of violence and arguably calling into question the effectiveness of the FIB and MONUSCO.
What does this re-capturing of Goma and, more recently, the South Kivu provincial capital Bukavu, mean, then, for the UN’s peacekeeping mission? MONUSCO has been present in the DRC since 2010, prior to which it existed in a different form (sans ‘stabilisation’) – MONUC. This latter mission was deployed in 1999 following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement that ‘ended’ the Second Congo War, also known as ‘Africa’s World War’. UN peacekeepers have therefore been present in the Congo for almost 26 years (plus 4 years from 1960-1964) and were set to fully withdraw by December 2024 after repeated calls from the Congolese government for the UN’s departure.
The M23’s campaign therefore raises numerous issues for the UN and MONUSCO. First, the triggering of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). It has long been accepted that IHL can apply to UN peacekeepers in situations of armed conflict. This includes, firstly, in relation to attacks against peacekeepers (personnel and objects in a peace operation are entitled to the protection given to civilians and civilian objects) and, secondly, when peacekeepers are engaged in armed conflict (UN peacekeepers are bound by and must observe IHL). The question in this situation, which colleagues have debated elsewhere, is which rules apply – those of an International Armed Conflict (IAC) or those of a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) or both – the answer to which largely depends on the extent to which Rwanda has control over M23.
Second, in a similar vein, MONUSCO’s role in the escalating violence arguably calls into question the UN’s interpretation of peacekeeping’s fundamental principles including: 1) the use of force by peacekeepers and 2) the maintenance of impartiality and potential implications for peacekeepers who are providing support or undertaking during joint operations with actors heavily engaged in fighting (in this instance with the FARDC and SAMIDRC). MONUSCO has one of the most robust mandates in the UN’s history; the mission is authorised to use ‘all means at its disposal…to promptly and effectively prevent armed groups’ attacks against civilians’ and in January this included MONUSCO carrying out fire missions against M23 in efforts to halt their territorial expansion. Whilst a discussion on these intricacies is not one to be had here, the issue remains and the implication of such an expansive interpretation (and the involvement of a mission in situations of protracted violence) is of further concern when it leads to a significant risk to peacekeeper safety, which, as seen at the end of January, can result in the loss of life.
Thirdly, the recent escalation of violence pushes MONUSCO’s withdrawal into the long grass. Prior to the M23’s revival, the Congolese government (and much of its civil society) had vehemently called for the UN’s departure; an accelerated withdrawal plan was agreed in 2023, leading to MONUSCO’s withdrawal in some eastern provinces. However, in MONUSCO’s December renewal, unlike in previous years, the Congolese government did not call for its immediate departure, leading to a renewal of its mandate until December 2025. Given the events of the last few weeks, it is difficult to see how MONUSCO can look to continue with its withdrawal plans, at least not until the situation has stabilised. Further questions can also be asked about the consequences of the UN withdrawing and the potential vacuum that will be left, one which could perhaps be filled by the SADC regional forces.
A way forward?
As many in the Security Council noted in the emergency meeting in January, followed by the UNSC Resolution of 21st February, the first step must be for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for every endeavour to be made to find a political solution. The question is – how can the parties be persuaded to find such a solution? One option may be to focus on placing political and economic pressure on Rwanda. In a statement delivered at the Security Council meeting on 26th January, the UK’s Ambassador James Kariuki, noted (without naming names in this sentence) that ‘planning, directing, sponsoring or conducting attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers may constitute a basis for UN sanctions designations’. Notwithstanding the gravity of the situation, the irony that the UK is now condemning Rwanda’s actions after its recent attempts to relocate asylum seekers to Rwanda as part of the now-scrapped Asylum partnership (albeit one which was led by the former government) is perhaps not lost on readers. Nevertheless, the issue of whether the Council could/should/would impose sanctions is an interesting one. Sanctions were imposed on rebel groups and their backers by the UN in 2012, with the European Union (as Rwanda’s biggest aid donor at the time) also imposing sanctions on Rwanda, partially freezing its financial aid. States such as the US, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK also suspended donor support in the wake of Rwanda’s military involvement in the DRC. Could we therefore see a repeat of 2012? It remains unclear at this stage as to whether there would be enough Council support for sanctions, or whether states may unilaterally suspend support or impose sanctions. Arguably a first important step would be for the EU to suspend its minerals deal with Rwanda and end its ‘unwavering support’; indeed, the European Parliament on 13th February adopted a resolution strongly condemning the situation in eastern DRC and calling for the suspension of the EU-Rwanda critical raw materials deal.
At the UN Security Council level, whilst some states, including China and African nations holding rotating seats in the Council, did not explicitly name Rwanda in the emergency Council meeting back in January, the P3 – France, the UK and the US – all named Rwanda and urged President Kagame to withdraw Rwandan troops from the Congo; this was followed by UNSC Res 2773 which explicitly urged ‘the DRC and Rwanda to return without preconditions to diplomatic talks’. There is certainly impetus, then, within the Security Council for action to be taken against Rwanda, buttressed by Congolese President Tshisekedi’s focus on building international pressure for Rwanda to face sanctions, but whether this will occur remains to be seen. At present, it is the US who have acted unilaterally, imposing some economic sanctions, with the UK pausing some bilateral aid and imposing diplomatic sanctions on the Rwandan Government. On 20th February, the US imposed financial and property sanctions on Gen. James Kabarebe, Rwanda’s Minister of State and former military commander and on Lawrence Kanyuka, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)/M23 spokesperson. More recent reports have also suggested that the DRC may rely on the Trump administration’s interest in transactional relationships to strike a mineral deal which would see the US gaining access to ‘critical minerals’ in exchange for some form of security in the region. Despite these positive steps, however, such actions have done little to quell the violence with Rwanda’s foreign ministry labelling the sanctions as ‘unjustified and unfounded’, noting that they would not resolve the conflict – the need for a diplomatic solution, with stronger action to be taken by the international community, therefore remains.