Reports suggest Turkey is in the process of applying for membership of the BRICS group. Mustafa Kutlay writes that while joining the group would reflect Turkey’s “multi-alignment” strategy, it would complicate the country’s relationship with the West.
There is never a dull moment in Turkish politics. On 2 September, Bloomberg reported Turkey had formally applied to join the BRICS group. Although Turkish officials have neither confirmed nor denied it (so far), the Turkish government’s attention to BRICS has been well known, at least since 2018.
One might suggest that Turkey’s recent move could be interpreted as a tactical attempt to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis western partners. This is undoubtedly part of Ankara’s game plan. However, Turkey’s interest in BRICS has more structural drivers –all come with delicate trade-offs and difficult choices.
Economics, geopolitics and beyond
Turkey’s first reason to join BRICS is the most obvious: the economy. As the centre of the global economy continues to shift to the non-western world, Turkey is keen to diversify its trade and investment links, specifically among the BRICS group. According to official figures, Turkey-BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) trade volume increased from $74.3 billion in 2013 to $121.3 billion in 2023. The lion’s share went to the Russia-China axis. In 2023, Turkey’s trade with Russia and China reached $105 billion, 17% of total external trade.
Russia is a key economic partner for Turkey with room to grow. Russia is Turkey’s primary energy supplier. More than 6.3 million Russian tourists visited Turkey in 2023. Ankara has cooperated with Moscow in building its first nuclear reactor, and since 1987, Turkish constructors have earned about $102 billion completing projects in Russia.
Turkey also aims to attract more investment from China, including closer cooperation in energy, telecommunications, infrastructure and green technologies. Recently, Chinese electric vehicle producer BYD agreed to build a $1 billion manufacturing plant in Turkey. Also, Turkey’s Ministry of Trade adopted the “far countries strategy” in 2022, which aims to quadruple trade relations with economies whose average distance to Turkey is 8,500 km. This strategy also covers large economies in the Global South, such as China, Brazil and India.
A second reason to turn to BRICS is geopolitical. On critical issues, Turkey does not see eye-to-eye with the West. Take two recent examples: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s war on Gaza. Turkey’s position in both cases, especially in the latter, is much closer to BRICS than the US and the EU. Also, Turkey’s security concerns in Syria significantly diverge from those of the American administration.
Accordingly, the Turkish government hopes to forge new partnerships with like-minded states in the Global South. The recent expansion of BRICS to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates has augmented its global reach and increased the group’s geopolitical value to Turkey.
The slow death of Turkey’s EU membership goal is certainly a political factor in the turn to BRICS. In the early 2000s, EU aspirations drove domestic and foreign affairs, and the EU provided a reference point for political-economic reforms. Yet Turkey-EU relations progressively became confrontational, dashing Turkey’s hopes of joining. EU officials cite democratic backsliding and regression in the rule of law as reasons to back off.
The Turkish side disagrees, criticising the EU’s approach to Turkey as short-sighted and lacking a strategic vision. And this is not just the government’s opinion. Most political opposition and civil society organisations are also fed up with the EU’s kicking-the-can-down-the-road policies. The ill-fated refugee deal between Turkey and the EU was the final nail in the coffin. This plagued Turkey-EU relations as strategic partners seeking a common future based on shared norms and vision.
Limits of multi-alignment
Middle powers consider that “running with the hare and hunting with the hounds” is one of the benefits of emerging multipolarity. They try to pursue a “multi-alignment” strategy by developing relations with the West and the non-western world simultaneously. They want to avoid overdependence on either the US or the China-Russia axis – a foreign policy approach sometimes called “strategic autonomy”.
Turkey is no exception. It also seeks a multi-alignment strategy. Yet, the “quest for strategic autonomy” comes with delicate trade-offs. Turkey’s institutional ties with the western alliance run deep. It is an important NATO member and part of the EU Customs Union. Traditionally, Turkey’s geostrategic and normative reference point has been the western alliance.
Thus, Turkey’s possible membership of BRICS will likely complicate its relations with the western bloc, which is already under pressure. BRICS and the US-led western alliance are in opposite camps on major geopolitical disputes, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, conflicts in the Middle East and beyond. It is unclear how Turkey will solve this riddle.
The economic rationale also requires a closer look. In 2023, Turkey’s total trade with BRICS was almost 60% of its total trade with its main commercial partner, the EU. In economic terms, for Turkey, BRICS means Russia and China. These two countries comprise 87% of Turkey-BRICS trade, but Turkey’s economic ties with Russia and China are highly asymmetric: Turkey’s exports are just 15.7% of its imports.
There is then the financial side. Turkey needs foreign capital to finance its growth – especially as the economy is in dire straits. For 2002-2023, almost 60% of inward foreign direct investment came from the EU. The Turkish financial system is highly integrated with the West.
BRICS’ ambition to reduce the financial hegemony of the western world resonates with the Turkish government, but 94% of Turkey’s external trade (imports plus exports) was denominated in US dollars and euros in 2022. This means Turkey will need to devise a sophisticated strategy to improve economic relations with BRICS without jeopardising long-standing economic ties with the West.
No longer separate worlds
One can argue that trade and geopolitics are separate worlds operating with different logics. In today’s world, however, economics and politics are becoming more intertwined than ever.
Competition between the great powers is fragmenting globalisation, economic interdependence is increasingly “weaponised” and protectionism is rising. This means that having the best of both worlds would require a clear reference point and a solid institutional framework linking the development-foreign policy nexus.
Turkey considers the BRICS grouping “complementary, not an alternative” to its relations with the West. Still, in the event of membership, it will likely face delicate trade-offs in balancing its long-standing alliance with the West against its new partnership with the BRICS grouping. If BRICS membership materialises, the big question will be whether it will be possible to devise an institutional framework that works for all parties.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: fortton / Shutterstock.com
